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The Truckers and Turnover Project is a statistical case study of a single
large trucking ﬁrm and its driver employees. The cooperating ﬁrm operates
in the largest segment of the for-hire trucking industry in the United States,
the “full truckload” (TL) segment, in which approximately 800,000 people
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the cooperating motor carrier. We also especially thank the managers and employees of the
cooperating carrier, whose involvement and active support made the project possible. The de-are employed, according to the 2002 Economic Census. The TL segment
has a high turnover labor market for its main employee group, tractor-
trailer drivers, and the project is designed to address a number of academic
and business questions that arise in this setting.
One major part of the project matches proprietary personnel and oper-
ational data to new data collected by the researchers to create a two-year
panel study of a large subset of new hires. The most distinctive innovation
of this project component is the data collection process, which combines
traditional survey instruments with behavioral economics experiments.
The survey data include information on demographics, risk and loss aver-
sion, time preference, planning, nonverbal IQ, and the MPQ personality
proﬁle. The data collected by behavioral economics experiments include
risk and loss aversion, time preferences (discount rates), backward induc-
tion, patience, and the preference for cooperation in a social dilemma set-
ting. Subjects will be followed over two years of their work lives. Among
the major design goals are to discover the extent to which the survey and
experimental measures are correlated, and whether and how much predic-
tive power, with respect to key on-the-job outcome variables, is added by
the behavioral measures.
The panel study of new hires is being carried out against the backdrop of
a second research component, the development of a more conventional 
in-depth statistical case study of the cooperating ﬁrm and its employees.
This component involves constructing large historical data sets from frag-
mented legacy IT sources and using them to create multivariate models of
turnover and productivity. Two main emphases are on the use of survival
analysis to model the ﬂow of new employees into and out of employment,
and on the correct estimation of the tenure-productivity curve for new
hires, accounting for the selection eﬀects of the high turnover.
The project is designed to last three and a half years, with the ﬁrst half-
year for set up, and then a year for the initial intensive data collection in the
panel study of new hires, in parallel with the construction of the data sets
for the statistical case study and the initial generation of modeling from
these data. Then there will be two years of lower-intensity work while fol-
low-up data is collected from the participants in the panel study of new
hires.
The balance of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 sets the
context by describing the U.S. trucking industry and the role of the TL seg-
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signers of the ﬁeld experiments used in the project thank Catherine Eckel and Kate Johnson
for sharing protocol and design details from ﬁeld experimental work in Mexico and for oﬀer-
ing helpful advice on our design issues. We also thank Urs Fischbacher, the developer of the
z-Tree software used in the economic experiments, for rushing development of a new version
with features we needed. The views expressed herein are those of the authors, and not of the
Federal Reserve System, nor the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, nor of any of the employ-
ers of any of the authors, nor of the project sponsors.ment within it. Section 2.3 discusses the nature of the labor market for TL
drivers and why it has had a high turnover equilibrium for about twenty-
ﬁve years. Section 2.4 discusses the nature of the research relationship with
the cooperating ﬁrm and how it was constructed. Section 2.5 discusses the
statistical analysis of historical operational and human resource data from
the ﬁrm. It has two main subparts: Section 2.5.1 exhibits preliminary ﬁnd-
ings on turnover, and section 2.5.2 does the same for productivity. Section
2.6 describes the design of the panel study of new hires and has four main
subparts. Section 2.6.1 describes the context of the project’s use of behav-
ioral economic ﬁeld experiments. Section 2.6.2 covers the process by which
new students are trained as tractor-trailer drivers, and section 2.6.3 dis-
cusses the schedule for the data collection eﬀort at the training school. Sec-
tion 2.6.4 lists and describes the ﬁve data collection activities (three exper-
iments and two survey-type instruments) that take place during the ﬁrst
two-hour session of each data collection event, while section 2.6.5 does the
same for the six activities (three experiments and three survey-type instru-
ments) during the second two-hour section of each data collection event.
Section 2.7 reﬂects on the implications of the project for the relevant re-
search communities and public policy. Appendix A lists the project team
during the ﬁrst two project years, and appendix B provides a list and time
line for the main data elements being collected by the project.
2.2 The U.S. Trucking Industry
2.2.1 Segments within the Industry
To a casual observer, one truck looks much like another, but in fact, the
operations that provide trucking services in the United States are mean-
ingfully diﬀerentiated from each other on several dimensions. At the
broadest level, trucking operations are broken into private carriage versus
for-hire carriage, based on a legal relationship: whether the carrier also
owns the freight (private carriage) or is hauling it for another party (for-
hire carriage).1 In recent years, for-hire carriers, one of which is the focus
of the present study, have typically operated about one-third of the heavy
trucks in the overall U.S. ﬂeet, but about three-ﬁfths of the total miles run
by such vehicles (Burks, Monaco, and Myers-Kuykindall 2004a).2
For-hire trucking is itself further broken into a number of distinct seg-
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1. Private carriers are ﬁrms primarily in nontrucking lines of business who provide truck-
ing services internally as support functions to their primary business operations. Examples
might be deliveries of food by a retail grocery chain to its stores in trucks it also owns or pick-
ups of parts for assembly at an auto plant by the auto manufacturer’s freight vehicles.
2. Heavy freight vehicles are deﬁned here as having a gross vehicle weight (GVW) of more
than 26,000 pounds, the level at which weight alone is suﬃcient to require the driver to hold
a commercial driver’s license (CDL).ments, separated along three cross-cutting dimensions. Within each seg-
ment, interﬁrm competition is signiﬁcant, but across segments it may be
muted, or in some cases even absent. The 2002 quinquennial Economic
Census, because of its use of the relatively new North American Industrial
Classiﬁcation System (NAICS), which is based on production process
characteristics, gives a good overview of the structure of the for-hire truck-
ing industry at this level of segmentation. For-hire truck transportation as
a whole, NAICS category 484, generated $165.56 billion in revenue in
2002, or about 1.56 percent of that year’s gross domestic product (GDP).3
The ﬁrst broad scale distinction within for-hire trucking is between ﬁrms
that use general purpose equipment (i.e., standard enclosed van trailers) to
handle general commodities and those that use specialized equipment to
handle special commodities (examples of the latter would be refrigerated
vans, ﬂatbeds, tank trailers, and various other types of specialized equip-
ment). According to the Economic Census, in 2002, general freight opera-
tions generated $111.60 billion annual revenue (67.4 percent of the total),
and specialized freight had $54.01 billion annual revenue (32.6 percent of
the total). A second cross-cutting broad scale distinction is between ﬁrms
that make long distance intercity hauls and those that specialize in opera-
tions in and around a particular metropolitan area. In 2002, the Economic
Census reports $120.21 billion in annual revenue for long-distance trucking
(72.6 percent of the total) and $45.35 billion for local hauls (27.4 percent).
A third cross-cutting broad scale distinction is based on the size of the
typical shipment hauled, and this dimension on which ﬁrms diﬀer is of par-
ticular relevance to the present study. It is easiest to understand this dis-
tinction by considering full-truckload service in contrast to the other two,
less-than-truckload (LTL) and parcel service. At one end of the spectrum
are ﬁrms like the one providing data for the current study. The archetypal
TL carrier sends a driver with a tractor-trailer to a shipper’s dock to ﬁll up
the trailer with a load, typically weighing from 10,000 to 48,000 pounds.4
The driver takes the loaded trailer wherever in the United States the ship-
ment is destined and unloads at the consignee’s dock. The driver is then dis-
patched empty, possibly after waiting for a while, to the next location where
a full load is available for pick up. Full-truckload carriers may use special-
ized equipment for special commodities, but if they haul general com-
modities, they use general purpose equipment to maximize the chance of
backhauls.5
By contrast, both parcel and LTL ﬁrms aggregate large numbers of in-
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3. Calculation is by the authors; total GDP is from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis: http://www.bea.gov/.
4. The variation is because some less-dense freight exhausts a trailer’s volume at low weight
levels, while higher-density freight hits the weight limit before the volume limit.
5. That is, this is to maximize the chance of picking up a return load from near the point at
which a ﬁrst one is delivered.dividual shipments collected at local terminals by local drivers into full
trailer loads and move them between terminals on ﬁxed route systems. 
Parcel carriers handle very small shipments (each piece typically being no
larger than 150 pounds, with the average nearer to 50 pounds), and LTL
carriers aggregate medium-sized shipments (widely varying, but with aver-
age size around 1,000 pounds). The Economic Census does not group par-
cel service ﬁrms with the for-hire trucking industry, but with air freight car-
riers. However, it does capture LTL and TL ﬁrms within trucking. In 2002,
the TL segment dominated the general freight portion of (nonparcel) for-
hire trucking, with 67.9 percent of the total employment and 83.8 percent
of the total revenue. If the segments of specialized freight that are prima-
rily TL by shipment size are added to the mix,6 then TL’s share of the total
employment of 1.137 million jumps to 72.8 percent, and its share of the to-
tal revenue of $124.50 billion rises to 77.1 percent.
2.2.2 Diﬀerences in the Type of Competition within Segments
The diﬀerences across the segments in the operational routines needed
aﬀect the form and intensity of competition within each segment. Speciﬁ-
cally, in the parcel and LTL segments, the need for a ﬁxed network of
freight rehandling terminals creates an entry barrier.7 While competition
among parcel and LTL carriers is frequently strong, it generally takes place
among incumbents. This is evidenced by the numbers of ﬁrms in the long-
distance parcel and LTL segments. In parcel, there are really only four
ﬁrms with full national coverage (UPS, FedEx, DHL, and the USPS).8
There are more LTL ﬁrms, but the number is still small. The 2002 Eco-
nomic Census identiﬁes eighty-nine long-distance general freight LTL
ﬁrms with ﬁve or more establishments, which is the minimum number of
terminals needed to give signiﬁcant geographic scope; there are only ﬁfty-
seven ﬁrms with ten or more.
But in TL there are essentially no entry barriers. Because TL carriers do
not normally rehandle freight once it is loaded, they do not typically re-
quire terminals, nor regular route patterns, for cost-competitive opera-
tions. So a one-truck carrier can cover the entire nation, and in doing so is
competitive, on a load-by-load basis, with most of the services oﬀered by
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6. Essentially, this means adding all specialized freight except household goods moving.
7. A brand new LTL carrier that wants to serve more than a single metropolitan area must
create and operate a network that is of minimum size necessary to attract suﬃcient traﬃc
from shippers with diﬀering destination demands, relative to the total shipment ﬂow densi-
ties in the geographic area it wishes to serve. But such networks exhibit strong economies of
density (a combination of both scale and scope economies)—at low volumes, the average
costs are high, but they fall rapidly as volume increases. The expenses of running such a net-
work until a large enough market share is obtained to make the new network cost competitive
with those of incumbent carriers are nonrecoverable (or “sunk”) if the ﬁrm exits. And the ex-
istence of a sunk cost of entry is the classic deﬁnition of an entry barrier.
8. Local parcel service is easier to enter, and there are many ﬁrms of small geographic
scope.one of the TL-segment’s giants. When more complex service coordination
is the key factor in market penetration, small ﬁrms can subcontract to
third-party logistics providers.9 And in fact, there is a continual ﬂow into,
and out of, the TL segment, mostly by ﬁrms operating at small to medium
scales. In TL, the 2002 Economic Census identiﬁed 25,831 long-distance
general freight ﬁrms.10 The market concentration levels in these two seg-
ments also show the diﬀering nature of competition. In LTL, the 2002 Eco-
nomic Census puts the revenue share of the top four long-distance general
freight LTL ﬁrms at 36.3 percent, while it calculates the share of the top
four long-distance general freight TL ﬁrms to be only 14.7 percent.
The implication of these facts is that most of TL service is what business
analysts call a “commodity business” and what economists call “perfectly
competitive.” As a result, the ﬁrms “at the margin,” whose choices set
prices for the whole market, in TL are often not the big players, exploiting
economics of scale, but may instead be the small ﬁrms in the competitive
fringe of the industry segment. Their pricing is, in turn, driven signiﬁcantly
by the wages drivers in such ﬁrms are willing to accept. Small ﬁrms gener-
ally face more modest wage expectations from their employees than do
large ones, and they also have the beneﬁt of more personal relationships
between owners, managers, and drivers. And owner-operators, who make
up a signiﬁcant subset of the small ﬁrms, can always choose to pay them-
selves less in order to get started in the business. Large ﬁrms can choose to
pay a modest premium above the level set by such ﬁrms because they may
have cost eﬃciencies in other areas, and they may be able to maintain a
small price premium due to oﬀering customers a number of diﬀerent ser-
vices in an integrated fashion, but if they raise their wages too high, they
will make their costs uncompetitive. This industry structure sets the con-
text for the derived demand for truck drivers in TL freight and the conse-
quent nature of the labor market for TL drivers.
2.3 The Labor Market for TL Drivers
2.3.1 Segmented Labor Markets Emerge
The American Trucking Associations’ (ATA) quarterly turnover report
typically shows the average turnover rate at large TL motor carriers to be
in excess of 100 percent per year (ATA Economic and Statistics Group
2005).11 Driver turnover among these carriers is an economically signiﬁ-
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9. Because a TL carrier can subcontract actual movements in a spot market to owner-
operators, it is possible for a ﬁrm to enter TL for-hire carriage initially with zero trucks.
10. Unlike the case of LTL, because TL ﬁrms don’t have freight terminal networks, single
establishment ﬁrms can be of national geographic scope, but, in fact, 997 of these had more
than one establishment, which is still more ﬁrms than in the LTL segment.
11. The ATA is a federation of several separate trucking associations.cant phenomenon—truckload carriers make up the largest segment of for-
hire motor carriage by employment, with approximately 600,000 drivers
working at any given time (U.S. Census Bureau 2004).12 This segment of 
the universe of for-hire trucking ﬁrms emerged into its present form after
the economic deregulation of 1980, which transformed the structure of the
trucking industry. Before deregulation, the nature of the entry barriers cre-
ated by government policies resulted in lots of TL output by ﬁrms using 
the LTL-type organization of production, with a ﬁxed network of freight
handling terminals (Belzer 1995; Burks 1999). But in the postderegulation
period, carriers specialized quite strongly in one or another speciﬁc ship-
ment size, from the smallest (parcel), through middle-sized shipments
(LTL), to the largest ones (TL) (Corsi and Stowers 1991; Belzer 1995;
Burks, Monaco, and Myers-Kuykindall 2004b).
As the TL industry segment emerged, so did a parallel segmentation of
the labor market for truck drivers (Belzer 1995; Burks 1999).13 Drivers
wanting to enter employment at parcel and LTL carriers generally found
job queues,14 while the labor market for TL driving jobs began exhibiting
high rates of turnover. In fact, the labor market in the TL segment has es-
sentially been in a high turnover equilibrium since soon after the end of the
recessions of 1981–1982.15
2.3.2 The TL Driver’s Job
To understand this situation, we start with a short description of the hu-
man capital investment needed to become a driver and then discuss the
working conditions encountered by the typical driver. Driving a tractor-
trailer requires training for, and passing, the state-administered written
and driving tests for a commercial driver’s license (CDL). Typically a high
school equivalent level of literacy is required, and training begins with at
least two weeks mixed between classroom work and in-truck practice. This
is usually followed by a few days to as much as a few weeks of initial driv-
ing experience, which is often obtained with an experienced driver riding
in the cab as a coach, while the trainee is still driving on a “learner’s per-
mit,” before he or she has taken the ﬁnal test for the CDL. While the CDL
test is administered separately by each state, as of 1991 they do so under
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12. The calculation is this: in the 2002 Economic Census, TL ﬁrms have 72.8 percent of the
total employment of 1.137 million workers in (nonparcel) trucking, and the usual rule of
thumb is that about 75 percent of the labor force employed by a TL ﬁrm is made up of driv-
ers, the balance being made up of sales, customer service, administrative, and managerial em-
ployees.
13. In fact, the argument of the second cited work is that the labor market segmentation was
itself a signiﬁcant driver of the parallel industry segmentation.
14. This was especially true at unionized carriers, but was also true to some degree at
nonunion ones.
15. It is an indication of the institutionalization of the high turnover secondary labor mar-
ket equilibrium in TL trucking that the ATA has published its turnover report continuously
since 1996.Federal standards for what must be included. It comprises both written
and driving portions, and the minimum legal age at which it may be taken
is twenty-one. Trucking ﬁrms generally considered a driver to be satisfac-
torily experienced after a year of work, so the level of human capital re-
quired places the job somewhere between unskilled and skilled, and it is
best labeled as “semiskilled.”
Once a driver is licensed, the key problem in retention is generally per-
ceived to be the working conditions faced by a tractor-trailer operator in the
archetypal long-haul, randomly dispatched, forty-eight-state service pro-
vided by most TL ﬁrms. In addition to the stresses of handling a big rig
among swarms of cars, many drivers have very long weekly work hours on
an irregular schedule. In one published survey of long-haul drivers, 21.9
percent reported working seventy plus hours each week, and two out of
three drivers reported working sixty plus hour weeks (Stephenson and Fox
1996). Other surveys report similar ﬁndings (Belman and Monaco 2001). A
survey of long-haul drivers in the Midwest found the median driver worked
sixty-ﬁve hours, with 25 percent reporting eighty or more hours. In a
twenty-four-hour period, the median hours worked was 11, median hours
driving was 8.5, and median hours in nondriving work was 2 (Belman,
Monaco, and Brooks 2005). These hours contrast to those in two industries
in which there are occupations with similar human capital requirements,
manufacturing and construction, which had average work weeks of 40.8
and 38.3 hours in 2004, respectively (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002).
A related issue is that long-haul drivers are often away from home for
multiple weeks at a time, with little predictability about the date of return.
In the same survey previously mentioned, only 20.7 percent of TL drivers
reported that they were home almost every day, while 28.7 percent of driv-
ers in the same study reported being home less often than once every two
weeks (Stephenson and Fox 1996). In the survey of drivers from the Mid-
west, the median long-haul driver had last been home four days prior to the
interview, though one-quarter had been away from home ten days or
longer (Belman, Monaco, and Brooks 2005). A less tangible issue is that
both drivers and ﬁrms like to think of CDL holders as professionals, in
command of a big rig and responsible for its safe operation. But trucking
is a service business, and a primary job function of the driver is to make
shippers and receivers happy. The implications vary by customer shipping
or receiving location, but this can place drivers somewhat lower than they
might expect on the supply chain status hierarchy.
Of course, not every driver in TL operations faces the same conditions.
The foregoing description applies to those “running the system,” or being
randomly dispatched across the forty-eight U.S. states. Some TL opera-
tions are dedicated to the service of particular large customers, and drivers
in these operations have a more restricted set of pickup and delivery loca-
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at home, as well. And some TL operations move freight between cities via
trailer-on-ﬂat-car (TOFC) or container-on-ﬂat-car (COFC) intermodal
methods. Drivers in these operations usually have regional or local runs to
and from intermodal facilities and are often home nightly, or nearly so.
Given these facts, a labor economist would expect to observe a “com-
pensating diﬀerential” built into the wages of TL drivers that have the
worst conditions. In other words, other things equal, TL ﬁrms should oﬀer
long-haul randomly dispatched drivers a higher earnings level than stay-at-
home jobs requiring similar human capital to compensate for their poorer
working conditions. But dissatisfaction over wage compensation levels is
frequently cited as a leading reason for TL driver turnover (Cox 2004).
2.3.3 Buying “Eﬀective Labor”
Perhaps a better way to think of the ﬁrm’s decision problem, which cap-
tures the nature of the driver labor market and the TL driver’s job, is to con-
sider the nature of “eﬀective labor” in this context. For a TL ﬁrm, this is the
application of labor services to move trucks to and from geographically spe-
ciﬁc customer locations on the particular time schedule desired by the ﬁrm.
There are three main factors that go into the cost of eﬀective labor in this
setting. One is the cost of recruiting and training new drivers to replace
those who leave, to account for the lower productivity of inexperienced
drivers, and also to account for any growth in business. A second is the cost
of paying compensating diﬀerentials to drivers with the worst conditions to
slow driver exits. The third is the operational cost of making driver working
conditions better. In response to stochastic customer demands, the most ef-
ﬁcient allocation of equipment frequently calls for irregular schedules and
little time at the driver’s home terminal. When this is the case, making
schedules more regular and increasing the driver’s time at home is costly.
The key point is that these three cost factors can, to a signiﬁcant degree,
be traded oﬀ against each other, with higher expenditure in one area low-
ering the expenditure in another. The ﬁrm’s goal can then be construed in
the standard manner: it is to ﬁnd the cost-minimizing mix of these factors.
Historically, the best thinking among many competing TL ﬁrms appears
to be that spending more on recruiting and training is a cheaper way to get
the needed units of eﬀective labor than paying more to raise compensating
wage diﬀerentials or improve schedules.16
A stable equilibrium characterized by high turnover rates deﬁnes what
labor economists call a “secondary labor market” (Cain 1976; Dickens and
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16. There is actually another cost factor in “eﬀective labor” that is nonnegligible, the costs
of accidents, which inexperienced drivers have at a higher rate than do experienced ones. We
do not address that cost in this paper.Lang 1993).17 The persistence of the secondary labor market for drivers in
TL trucking since sometime in the early 1980s has occasioned much dis-
cussion in the trucking industry trade press over the years, as well as a num-
ber of academic studies (examples include Casey 1987; Griﬃn, Rodriguez,
and Lantz 1992; Stephenson and Fox 1996; Griﬃn and Kalnbach 2002;
Beadle 2004). Through the ATA, the industry has commissioned signiﬁ-
cant analytic eﬀorts to understand the management issues raised by a high
turnover business model and the long-term demographic trends aﬀecting
the viability of the model (Gallup Organization 1997; ATA Economic and
Statistics Group 2005). The major ﬁndings suggest that ﬁrms are aware of
the trade-oﬀs among the components of eﬀective labor and that within this
framework ﬁrms adjust to changes in the conditions of the demand for, and
supply of, eﬀective labor. It appears that as a result, the labor market as a
whole also adjusts, perhaps with some lags, to such changes.
A major study done by consultants at Global Insight for the ATA links
the supply of truck drivers to the supply of labor for semiskilled jobs in con-
struction because this type of work often represents the next best opportu-
nity for likely truckers. The labor demands in these two industries are driven
by signiﬁcantly diﬀerent macroeconomic factors. During the 1990s, when
the derived demand for drivers was high, there was a modest premium—
truckers’ earnings were an average of 6 to 7 percent above a position de-
manding similar levels of human capital in construction. The downturn of
the economy in 2000 to 2001 created slack in the trucking labor market, but
the arrival of low interest rates kept the derived demand in construction rel-
atively stronger. As a result, for a few years, the average long-haul driver
could expect to make less than if employed in the construction industry. By
2004, the gap had narrowed, with long haul drivers’ earnings 1.5 percent be-
low that of construction workers (Global Insight, Inc. 2005). These facts
suggest that wage levels do adjust over time to changes in the balance of la-
bor supply and labor demand, but the persistence of the high turnover num-
bers shows that the levels of compensating diﬀerential being oﬀered are not
suﬃcient to lower turnover to the levels typical in other blue-collar jobs.18
It is well documented that the ﬂows into and out of industry (as well as
related movements of dissatisﬁed drivers between ﬁrms) represent a sub-
stantial cost to ﬁrms. A study by the Upper Great Plains Transportation
Institute found in 1998 that replacing one dry van TL driver conservatively
costs $8,234, and the industrywide cost total was estimated at nearly $2.8
billion in 1998 dollars (Rodriguez et al. 2000). The study’s authors sug-
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17. Correspondingly, the ATA typically reports turnover rates at LTL ﬁrms to be in the 10
percent to 20 percent range, which makes them roughly equivalent in turnover to nontruck-
ing jobs requiring similar amounts of human capital.
18. The Global Insight study used government data that does not distinguish TL from LTL
among drivers for ﬁrms in long-distance trucking, but TL drivers make up the predominant
share of the categories they analyze.gested that this estimate is conservative, but it gives an idea of the magni-
tude of the turnover costs that TL ﬁrms must balance against the alterna-
tive costs of raising wages or adjusting operational and dispatching deci-
sions in order to lower turnover.
One might well ask whether ﬁrms have fully explored the possibilities for
trade-oﬀs among the three factors behind the cost of eﬀective TL labor.
Most ﬁrms are operating with high turnover costs and relatively lower
costs for compensating diﬀerentials and operational adjustments that im-
prove driver lifestyles. Is it possible that some large discrete shift along the
frontier could move a ﬁrm out of a “local cost minimum” in this region to
a diﬀerent local minimum that might be lower in total costs?
In fact, J.B. Hunt, then the second largest ﬁrm in the industry, engaged
in a highly publicized experiment with switching from a business model
with high turnover and modest wage costs to one with higher wage costs
but lower turnover in 1996. It took the portion of its workforce facing the
worst conditions (long and irregular dispatches) and raised wages by 35
percent, while at the same time closing down its driver training schools
(Cullen 1996; Isidore 1997). The net result was a cut in both turnover and
accident rates by approximately one-half (Belzer, Rodriguez, and Sedo
2002). However, the long-run net ﬁnancial beneﬁts were not as clear
(Waxler 1997); most of the other large ﬁrms in the industry, including the
one providing data for the present study, continue to train many of their
new drivers from scratch, and nearly all TL ﬁrms use the high turnover–
modest-pay-premium model.
The long-run dynamics of driver labor supply and demand are made
more complex by the growth of the long-haul TL industry. Between 2004
and 2014, Global Insight projects it will grow at a rate of 2.2 percent, which
translates into an additional 320,000 heavy-duty long-haul new jobs. This
statistic does not include the number of drivers needed to replace those
who will retire during this time; the industry will need to ﬁnd an estimated
219,000 additional drivers to replace the one in ﬁve drivers who are ﬁfty-
ﬁve years old or older and are approaching retirement. Concurrently with
an increase in demand for drivers, the growth rate of the overall U.S. labor
force will slow from 1.4 percent to .5 percent between 2005 and 2014
(Global Insight, Inc. 2005). Another challenging trend for the industry is
that to date, Hispanics, who comprise the fastest growing segment in the
workforce, represent a lower percentage of drivers than they do of the over-
all labor supply. It is possible that the conjunction of these factors means
that a secular trend toward higher prices for trucking labor has begun.
This, in turn, could shift the nature of the trade-oﬀs that ﬁrms face among
the components of eﬀective TL labor, and—along with fuel price trends
and the limitations on the growth of labor productivity in trucking (Boyer
and Burks 2007)—it could also dampen the long-run growth prospects of
the industry (Reiskin 2006).
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The cooperating trucking ﬁrm is a large company of national geographic
scope, with divisions that operate in several of the segments of TL truck-
ing, including long-haul random dispatch service, dedicated carriage for
large customers, and intermodal services. By revenue and employment it is
among the top one hundred ﬁrms in TL. The ﬁrm began as a family-owned
enterprise in the regulatory era, although it has grown through multiple ac-
quisitions as well as internal expansions, and the original family has not
been centrally involved in top management for some time.
Under family control, the management culture was stable and eﬀective,
but was also, by design, relatively inward looking. It was based on long-
term employment relationships with managerial and administrative ranks
ﬁlled with “trucking people,” whose careers tended to be built within this
single ﬁrm. A signiﬁcant portion of the management started as front-line
driver supervisors or, in some cases, as drivers and then worked their way
up. Managers at the ﬁrm tended to learn their skills on the job and did not
see much need to look elsewhere, except to service vendors who could pro-
vide expertise relevant to particular practical business problems, such as
targeted marketing surveys.
During the period between deregulation and the end of the twentieth
century, the ﬁrm made many major and critical strategic moves, some of
which were quite daring. But the decisions leading to these moves were pri-
marily based on the vision and judgment calls of the trucking people in top
managerial positions. There was little thought of broad strategic planning
in the formal sense. Early in the new millennium, a new CEO, who had sig-
niﬁcant formal training in management-related areas, directed the ﬁrst ex-
ercise in formal strategic planning in the ﬁrm’s history, following a process
recipe provided by a major consultancy. This exercise began to increase the
interest within the ﬁrm in planning as a useful activity and also increased
interest in establishing the analytic foundations for planning work.
The University of Minnesota, Morris, faculty began to work with the
ﬁrm starting in the fall of 2002, initially on a single pilot project in the form
of faculty-guided analysis by an advanced undergraduate student. The
project was successful and laid the foundation for an expanding series of
faculty-guided research projects over the next two years on a variety of top-
ics. These projects operated on a gift-exchange basis: the faculty and stu-
dents contributed their time as teaching and learning functions and the
ﬁrm paid out-of-pocket expenses and provided access (under appropriate
conﬁdentiality restrictions) to proprietary business data. The core of the
process involved selecting topics of both business and academic interest
and for which advanced undergraduates could provide analyses of business
use, as well as generating course-level academic output. By the third year
of such projects, about twenty students supervised by six diﬀerent faculty
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analysis of exit interviews, to some initial turnover and productivity analy-
ses, to work on the recruitment and retention of Hispanic employees.
Within the ﬁrm, the linchpin of the process was a senior executive who
had joined the ﬁrm from the outside and who had signiﬁcant prior experi-
ence working fruitfully with academics. He was promoted to responsibil-
ity for a number of the aspects of human resources and driver training 
and moved into his new role just as the ﬁrm as a whole was opening up in-
ternally to the importance of strategic analysis. From this initial contact,
UMM came to work with several other executives, at similar or higher lev-
els of authority and responsibility, on speciﬁc projects.
On the UMM side, the linchpin was an industry studies connection: the
initial supervising faculty member (Burks) worked with the Sloan-funded
Trucking Industry Program as a doctoral student and as a postdoctoral fel-
low.19 This added academic depth and polish to trucking industry institu-
tional knowledge he had originally begun acquiring in his youth, when he
worked as a tractor-trailer driver during the era of deregulation, between
two bouts in graduate school. Burks’s background, along with a passion
for all things trucking-related, gave him credibility with executives and al-
lowed him to guide the UMM side of the relationship so that useful busi-
ness deliverables always accompanied the academic results of interest to
faculty and students.
On the basis of the relationship constructed through the student proj-
ects, Burks and a second UMM researcher, biostatistician Jon Anderson,
developed a small project contractually sponsored by the ﬁrm for the sum-
mer of 2004. This project began exploring the historical data retained by
the ﬁrm for strategic purposes, including the analysis of the determinants
of driver productivity and turnover. The larger scale design of the Truckers
and Turnover Project was developed from the starting point provided by
the results of this project. Burks, who devoted a sabbatical year to the proj-
ect, is the principal organizer, and he has been joined in creating and de-
veloping the substantive content of the project by the coauthors of the
present chapter, as well as by a number of other colleagues, who are based
at several other institutions.20
2.5 Research Component One: Statistical Case Study of Historical Data
Research Component One is a statistical case study of some of the his-
torical personnel and operations data of the cooperating trucking ﬁrm.
There are three interrelated parts to this component. The ﬁrst is building
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19. Burks was a doctoral student at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst; the Truck-
ing Industry Program (TIP) was then located at the University of Michigan and is now hosted
by the Georgia Institute of Technology.
20. A complete list of coinvestigators appears in appendix A.the data sets needed for analysis, the second is analyzing turnover, and the
third is analyzing driver productivity. The goal of the ﬁrst part is to take the
many diﬀerent data and report outputs produced by the fragmented legacy
information technology (IT) resources at the ﬁrm and construct from them
data sets that permit useful strategic and tactical analyses. Because the
ﬁrm’s IT investments began in the early mainframe era, and those invest-
ments were focused primarily on solving succeeding generations of practi-
cal business problems, the data storage and reporting functions at the ﬁrm
do not lend themselves easily to strategic use. Data set assembly, docu-
mentation, and validation are consuming, and will continue to consume, a
very large part of the project’s resources.
The goal of the second part is to use survival analysis to map the diﬀer-
ences in turnover by driver group, to use hazard functions to explore the
diﬀerent time paths of exits by driver group, and to use Cox proportional
hazard multivariate regression to analyze the interaction between the 
various factors that can aﬀect exits. The goal of the third part is to use
panel data multivariate regression models to map the tenure-productivity
curve of new drivers as they gain experience, using a ﬁxed eﬀects variant to
make a ﬁrst-order adjustment for the impact of selection on the tenure-
productivity relationship. Once the panel data model is suﬃciently robust,
the estimated ﬁxed eﬀects will then be further dissected statistically.
A key (proprietary) business deliverable from this part of the project will
be the assembly of the results of the turnover and productivity models to
create an “expected net value of human capital” model for the investment
in recruiting and training various types of drivers, who are utilized in var-
ious types of operational settings at the ﬁrm. Central academic results are
expected to be generated from both the turnover and productivity models.
Additionally, the analysis of Research Component Two, the panel study of
new hires, will be integrated with the results of the analyses from the sta-
tistical case study. We next brieﬂy describe the challenges and sketch a few
pilot ﬁndings from the turnover and productivity analyses.
2.5.1 Initial Work on Turnover
The proprietary human resource data set used for initial turnover anal-
ysis was constructed from three distinct initial data ﬁles, which share the
feature that each record provides information on one driver during one cal-
endar week. The constituent ﬁles covered diﬀerent calendar periods, so we
utilize the calendar window during which all three overlap, September 1,
2001, through March 31, 2005. The ﬁrst ﬁle, Weekly Hires, consists of
some of the data elements recorded about a driver during the week he or
she is hired. Drivers who are rehired during the calendar window have
more than one line in this ﬁle. The second ﬁle, Weekly Separations, con-
tains information recorded about a driver during the week that he or she
separates from the ﬁrm. Drivers who are rehired and who, as a result, also
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line in this ﬁle. The third ﬁle, Weekly Employment, consists of one obser-
vation in each week for each driver employed during that week. Combin-
ing all three data sets gives a complete picture, week by week, of ﬂows in,
ﬂows out, and who is currently working for the ﬁrm.
However, there are some important limitations in these data and a re-
sulting major problem with analyzing them. The Weekly Hire and Weekly
Separations data ﬁles contain a number of useful variables, including sev-
eral key breakout variables, such as the driver’s division (e.g., dedicated, in-
termodal, system) and what kind of prior training or experience the driver
had when they joined the ﬁrm.21 Unfortunately, the Weekly Employment
data ﬁle is missing these key variables. This means that at the present ini-
tial stage of the analysis we don’t have this information on the drivers who
do not experience either a hire or a separation event during our calendar
window. And our information is incomplete for drivers who experience
only a hire or only a separation event. In particular, the division to which
the driver is assigned is known prospectively at the time of the hire event.
But it changes later for many drivers, and we only have the updated infor-
mation in the separation event record for that subset that does depart.
To partially compensate for these problems, we take the following steps.
Breakout variables that are of interest in the present study are carried for-
ward to all observations on a given driver, from that driver’s hiring obser-
vation. This gives us reasonably accurate information on the previous
trucking industry training or experience of each driver (because this is not
information that changes with tenure). It also tells us which division of the
ﬁrm’s operations a new driver is expected to be assigned to at the time of
hire. Because the data on the type of work assignment is so noisy after this
process, and because we would only be able to update it for those who exit,
we do not pursue speciﬁc ﬁndings about the impact of the type of work on
retention in the present analysis.22
A further implication of the data limitations is that we restrict ourselves
in this initial work to the subset of drivers for which we observe a hiring
event during our calendar window because we do not have either hire or
separation observations for long-time incumbent employees and so are
missing their key breakout variable values. Given an industry context in
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21. Not included, on the other hand, are items such as age, gender, level of formal educa-
tion, or ethnic category.
22. We experimented with the following procedure. We ﬂowed the values from the separa-
tion observation backward, to all prior observations of that particular driver, for the variable
recording division to which the driver is assigned—for those drivers who have an observed
separation only. (This overwrote the forward-ﬂowed divisional assignment data from the time
of hire for those separated drivers for whom we observe the hire event.) This gives us improved
information on those who separated, but at the cost that noise is diﬀerentially left in the ob-
servations on those who do not separate. The results were not credible, so we abandoned this
part of the analysis until further information can be added to the data set.which there are large inﬂows all the time, however, this subgroup is of sig-
niﬁcant independent interest, irrespective of what might be found if a more
inclusive group could be analyzed. Also, because we are not conﬁdent that
we can correctly identify all the characteristics of second or later spells of
employment, we here only examine the ﬁrst spell of employment during
our calendar window, for those drivers who have more than one observed
hiring event.23These restrictions still leave us with a lot of data: we analyze
a set of more than 500,000 observations covering more than 5,000 distinct
individual drivers, observed during the period from September 1, 2001,
through March 31, 2005.24
Our procedure will be to ﬁrst examine the survival curve for the entire set
of drivers we consider here, along with the associated hazard function,
which exhibits the time path of exit risk that gives rise to the survival curve.
Then we will separate out the survival curves for discrete subgroups of in-
terest and test for diﬀerences between them, and we will also examine the
hazard functions for each subgroup for useful insights. It should be noted
that our analysis does not distinguish between the possible diﬀerent rea-
sons for separation. In particular, of the separation events that we observe,
76.4 percent are voluntary quits, while 23.6 percent are discharges for
cause, but our survival curves and hazard functions include both.25
Descriptive Results for All First-Hire-Event Employment Spells
We begin by examining the survival pattern for the ﬁrst observed em-
ployment spell of all drivers having a hire-event during our calendar win-
dow. Figure 2.1 displays the central results. The vertical axis indicates the
percentage of the population initially entering employment that remains
after each amount of time on the job, shown on the horizontal axis in weeks
from the start of employment.
Some key qualitative facts emerge from this picture. First, turnover rates
do look extremely high. At 10.1 weeks, 25 percent of the population is
gone, 50 percent have left by 29.1 weeks (the median survival time), and 75
percent have departed by 75 weeks. Second, there is a leveling oﬀ of de-
partures in the second six months on the job, followed by an acceleration
at the end of the ﬁrst year. This is consistent with the fact that most of the
trainees observed here who undergo the ﬁrm’s full training program sign a
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23. This does not prevent us from examining rehires, as a signiﬁcant number of the ﬁrst
spells we observe are of rehired drivers.
24. The precise number of drivers and observations is suppressed for conﬁdentiality reasons.
25. The primary statistical methodology is survival analysis. Standard descriptive and an-
alytical methods are problematic when the key dependent variable (here, the length of job
tenure) is a time period, as ongoing spells observed at any given point in time are censored:
they continue for an unknown further period. Instead, a conditional probability approach is
needed to correctly take into account the statistical information contained in censored ob-
servations (Kiefer 1988; Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez 2004)contract to pay back about half the cost of training (several thousand dol-
lars) if they do not complete a year of service after training. Plus, the job
options within trucking are more plentiful for drivers with a year of expe-
rience. The surprise, in fact, is that so many new drivers leave before the
ﬁrst year is up. Clearly, these departures cause both the ﬁrm and the driv-
ers to incur real costs.
Further insights may be obtained by examining the hazard function for
this group of drivers. (See ﬁgure 2.2.) The vertical axis indicates the prob-
ability of leaving during any particular week shown on the horizontal axis,
given that the driver made it to the beginning of the week.26Here the diﬀer-
ences in risk of departure are shown more clearly. Exit risk is highest at
about six to eight weeks, which is approximately when new trainees ﬁrst
pull a load by themselves, without the assistance of an instructor-driver in
the cab. Once drivers make it past this stage, exit risk declines sharply un-
til the one-year mark is reached, when separation risk spikes to almost the
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26. Or, to be slightly more careful, the vertical axis shows a “departure rate” because it is
the conditional probability just described, divided by the number of analysis-time units con-
tained in each unit on the horizontal axis. In our case the denominator is 1, so the rate is also
a simple conditional probability. Formally, the hazard function is deﬁned to be the ratio of the
density of employment duration to the employment duration survival function, or h(x)  
f(x)/S(x).
Fig. 2.1 Kaplan-Meier survival curve: Estimates the percentage remaining from
this set of drivers at each week of tenuresame level as at the beginning. Drivers who make it to the end of two years
are essentially self-selected to have a high likelihood of turning out to be
longer-term employees.
Descriptive Results by Level of Previous Experience or Training
Drivers who are hired by the cooperating ﬁrm arrive with diﬀerent lev-
els of prior training and prior experience. In ﬁgures 2.3 and 2.4 and table
2.1, the diﬀering performance of these subgroups with respect to retention
gives rise to separate survival curves and hazard functions. The best reten-
tion is exhibited by the small group (4 percent of the total) of rehires. This
can be observed from the fact that their survival curve is well above the
curves of the other subgroups and is quantiﬁed in table 2.1. We can see in
the table that rehires have the longest time period of any group at which 75
percent still remain (almost four months), and at which 50 percent still re-
main (over ﬁve years). Rehires also have a retention period for 25 percent
of the starting population that is so long that it cannot be meaningfully cal-
culated in our data. This is not surprising—rehires are the self-selected
subset of drivers who are not only experienced drivers, but who have
worked at least once already at the cooperating ﬁrm. Having explored
other opportunities, they now choose to return to this ﬁrm as their best
current option.
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Fig. 2.2 Smoothed hazard function: Estimates the rate of departure from this 
set of drivers at each week of tenure, conditional on survival to the beginning of 
the weekFig. 2.3 Kaplan-Meier survival curves by type of student: Estimates the percent-
age remaining from each subset at each week of tenure
Fig. 2.4 Smoothed hazard functions by type of student: Estimates the rate of 
departure from each subset of drivers, conditional on survival to the beginning 
of the weekThe hazard function for these drivers is distinctive as well. It shows a
modest spike in exit probability early, with falling exit risk thereafter, and
also a very distinct periodicity during the ﬁrst year, which likely reﬂects the
incentive eﬀects of the ﬁrm’s quarterly bonus system. Rehires are eligible
for the ﬁrm’s quarterly bonus immediately upon starting work and also
have experience with the incentive provided by the particular bonus system
oﬀered by the ﬁrm. The periodicity in the rehire hazard function suggests
drivers in this group who may consider leaving during the ﬁrst year are
likely to wait until they have completed a quarter and have qualiﬁed for the
bonus before separating. Also noteworthy, and sensible, is that there is no
“ﬁrst-year-eﬀect” spike in the rehire hazard rate—this eﬀect in the aggre-
gate hazard function is entirely due to the behavior of other subgroups.
Next consider experienced drivers. These are students who have signiﬁ-
cant levels of over-the-road tractor-trailer experience with other employers
before coming to the cooperating ﬁrm. Like rehires, they only have to take
a refresher training course that takes a few days, instead of the multiple-
week basic training course all other drivers new to the ﬁrm are required to
pass. Their retention performance is not as good as that of the rehires, but
it is still well above that of the lowest groups, with 75th, 50th, and 25th per-
centile retention periods of 10.4, 29.4, and 98.3 weeks, respectively. Their
hazard function shows the usual pattern of an early peak, with later de-
clines, and appears to have a muted version of the periodicity seen in re-
hires. This would make sense, as experienced drivers are eligible for the
bonus system immediately, but don’t have as much experience with its in-
centives as rehires.
The next item to note is akin to Sherlock Holmes’s famous observation
about the mysterious behavior of the dog in the night. The dog didn’t bark
when it should have, and correspondingly one would expect new students
with no prior background of any kind in trucking to have diﬀerent (and in
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Table 2.1 Weeks of job tenure by type of student
Estimated job tenure (weeks)
Drivers for whom a  Percent 75% of 50% of 25% of
“hire event” is observed  of drivers  drivers drivers
(N > 5,000) drivers remaining remaining remaining
All drivers 100 10.1 27.4 72.1
Rehire 4 16.6 284.7 n.a.a
Experienced 8 10.4 29.4 98.3
New students 73 11.1 30.1 73.1
Limited experience 3 8.1 21.1 53.1
Prior training 14 6.7 18.1 49.1
aRehires have a retention period for 25% of the starting population that is so long that it can-
not be meaningfully calculated in the data.particular, poorer) retention performance than experienced drivers.27 But
in these data, both new students who are learning the industry from scratch
and experienced drivers who are new to the cooperating ﬁrm have closely
similar retention behavior for nearly the ﬁrst entire year of employment.
New students actually do slightly better than experienced drivers near 
the end of the ﬁrst year. At that point, their hazard function spikes very
sharply, and their performance drops below that of experienced drivers.
This is likely associated with the facts that their training contracts are com-
pleted and they then have enough experience to easily switch trucking
ﬁrms if they desire. Because new students are by far the largest group (73
percent) of drivers for whom we observe a hire event, their behavior is very
important in determining that of the entire aggregate driver population.
Thus, the size of their initial aggregate spike in exit risk, as well as that af-
ter a year of service, both strongly shape the aggregate survival curve and
hazard function.
As it turns out, a Chi-square statistical test of the signiﬁcance of the
diﬀerence in overall survival performance between new drivers and those
with experience at ﬁrms other than the one providing the data shows that
experienced drivers do better overall, at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level 
( p   .018). But, as table 2.1 shows, the eﬀect is all driven by the one-year
exits of new drivers, and the magnitude of the eﬀect is much smaller than
the diﬀerence between either of these groups and rehires.28For instance, 50
percent of the rehire group is estimated to still be at work for the cooperat-
ing ﬁrm 5.48 years after the hire event we observe, while for drivers with ex-
perience at other ﬁrms, it is only 6.8 months, and for new students it is es-
sentially the same, at 6.9 months.29At longer durations of employment, we
see a modest diﬀerence: 25 percent of the drivers with experience at other
ﬁrms still remain at 22.6 months, while it is only 16.9 months for the same
proportion of new drivers.
Last, consider the retention performance of the two ﬁnal groups: drivers
with some prior experience and those with some prior training. Both these
groups are identiﬁed by the driver recruiting staﬀat the cooperating ﬁrm as
having some background in trucking, but not enough to qualify the student
to take only the short training course for fully experienced drivers. To ex-
tend the previous allusion, here is a dog barking loudly—these two groups
do quite badly, by comparison to students wholly new to trucking. The job
tenure lengths for the retention of the 75th, 50th, and 25th percentiles of
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27. The mysterious behavior (in “The Silver Blaze”) was that the dog did not bark when
someone removed a valuable race horse from the barn, which was a clue to the thief’s identity.
28. The pairwise diﬀerences between rehires and new drivers, and between rehires and ex-
perienced drivers, are both signiﬁcant—the Chi-square p-values for Type 1 error are zero to
four decimal places.
29. The base time unit for the statistical analysis is weeks, so months are everywhere calcu-
lated as weeks divided by 4.33.students with limited driving experience is 1.87, 4.94, and 12.25 months, re-
spectively. This tells us that only 25 percent make it to the completion of
their one-year-service-after-training employment contract; the other 75
percent are incurring a multithousand dollar debt in order to leave early.30
Students with only some prior training, but no prior experience, do even
worse, with retention periods for the 75th, 50th, and 25th percentiles of
only 1.58, 4.18, and 11.33 months, respectively. So less than one-quarter of
these students complete their training contracts. (The diﬀerence between
these two groups is signiﬁcant by the Chi-square test, at the 5 percent level
[p-value of .045.])31
Why should these students be at the bottom of the performance ranking
when normally prior training or experience would be expected to improve
retention? A reasonable hypothesis is that it has to do with the distinctive
characteristics of a high-turnover, secondary labor market. In this type of
market, there is always demand for drivers at some job or other. So some-
one with prior experience of any kind, as well as the graduates of any of the
many commercial driver training schools, can get some job, as long as they
have a CDL. It may not be a very desirable job, but it is possible to accu-
mulate experience if one is willing to put up with some of the poorer work-
ing conditions available in an industry segment known for having poor
conditions on average. In this context, coming to the cooperating ﬁrm and
being willing to assume the debt contract that accompanies the full train-
ing program is a bad signal. There may be many speciﬁc reasons outside a
prospective driver’s control that lead to such a decision. For example, the
student could have experienced some kind of family event that stopped his
or her prior training before the CDL exam or caused him or her to quit a
prior job quickly. But, on average, students with some prior training or
some prior experience are likely either to be job switchers who just couldn’t
do better for the time being, but who will be looking to leave as soon as pos-
sible, or to be job candidates who were unsuccessful at someone else’s
training course, or were otherwise judged inadequate by other ﬁrms. Either
of these reasons means the student is more likely to depart.
2.5.2 Pilot Work on Productivity
The pilot work on productivity utilized a diﬀerent set of data ﬁles from
the cooperating ﬁrm than did the turnover work described in the preced-
ing section. We began with two data ﬁles, one containing basic information
(especially hire date and separation date, if any) on all the drivers who had
separated during the period of one year (for example, in some of the pilot
66 Stephen V. Burks et al.
30. Except for those who are hired by a rival ﬁrm that is willing to pay oﬀ their indebted-
ness—something which is known to occur in this labor market.
31. The pairwise diﬀerences between either of these groups and any of those with better re-
tention performance is highly signiﬁcant—the Chi-square p-values for Type 1 error are zero
to four decimal places.work we used 2003), and the second, extracted at the end of that year, con-
taining similar information on all currently employed drivers. Then two
separate additional ﬁles containing demographic information, and racial
and ethnic identity from voluntary Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) employee disclosure forms, were added.
Merging these using the internal employee number (driver number) as
an identiﬁer immediately caused problems. It turned out that driver num-
bers are not unique, but are recycled on a regular basis, so we had to de-
lete some duplicate cases that really represented diﬀerent drivers.32 “Hire
date,” a key variable for survival analysis also turned out to be problematic.
As one might expect in a high turnover setting, a small but signiﬁcant num-
ber of drivers become reemployed, some having as many as four or ﬁve suc-
cessive employment spells. The problem was that drivers gone for less time
than some threshold (six months at one point, but varied over time) kept
their original hire date, while those gone longer were assigned a new one.
The latter fact made it impossible to distinguish rehires from new drivers
with recycled driver numbers.
To do a productivity analysis, the key addition to the records already de-
scribed was information from the ﬁrm’s payroll records, which provide a
week-by-week compilation of the items added to (or deducted from) each
employee’s pay, with each such transaction constituting a line of data. The
taxes and fringe beneﬁt co-pays were in a separate data source to which we
did not have access, but even so the initial ﬁles had as many as forty-four
transactions per driver per pay period, with more than one million lines of
data per ﬁle. We proceeded to document the diﬀerent variables that con-
tained coded information about the driver’s work assignment and pay
structure, consulting subject-matter experts at the ﬁrm regularly. Each
variable could take on multiple values, the meanings of which to some de-
gree changed over time as operational needs changed. In addition, we be-
gan to document all the meanings of the values of the key variable specify-
ing what type of transaction each line of the payroll ﬁle contained. There
were several hundred distinct values of this variable, including values de-
noting several diﬀerent types of mileage pay, dozens of types of lump sum
pay for speciﬁc tasks, dozens of types of pay advances and pay deductions,
and so on.
After documentation, we next “rolled up” the payroll ﬁle. We sorted the
ﬁle by driver and pay-week and then accumulated all the transaction-level
information we were interested in having on a weekly basis into new vari-
ables so that the last transaction in each driver-pay-week record contained
cumulative information for the week. The kinds of information in the re-
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32. For the pilot work, we did not want the responsibility of making use of social security
numbers, although a secure method for making use of the relevant identiﬁcation information
has been developed for later work.sulting records included such key items as the total (paid) miles, and the
amount paid for them, and the total number of dispatches. Also included
was information on various kinds of ancillary activities when they gener-
ated a pay transaction, such as paid customer stops, pay supplements for
very short runs, paid maintenance delays, and so on. The payroll data thus
provides a very rich set of information about what each driver does during
each week.
However, the payroll ﬁle records what drivers are actually paid for, which
is in general a subset of what they actually do. So, for instance, the ﬁrst
pickup stop and ﬁrst delivery stop on each loaded dispatch are not sepa-
rately compensated. Extra pickup or delivery stops are paid when they oc-
cur on long-distance random dispatch loads, but only some of the time
when they are on a scheduled run dedicated to a particular customer that
is engineered to have multiple stops. Most drivers are primarily compen-
sated by the mile, and these drivers are paid miles for all their dispatches,
which normally includes loaded miles, plus miles pulling an empty trailer,
repositioning for a new load, and also any bobtail miles (i.e., without a
trailer). However, drivers generally run more miles than those for which
they are paid. Paid miles are based on a least-distance routing algorithm,
which is historically standard in the industry but which undercounts the
actual miles by several percent (recent guesstimates by managers at our
ﬁrm for the average undercount range from 4 percent to 6 percent).33 De-
spite these limitations, the payroll data provide a very useful starting point
for the productivity analysis.34
Descriptive Productivity Results for Inexperienced 
Long-Haul Random Dispatch Drivers
We began our pilot work with a subset of drivers for the years 2002 and
2003. The subset is those drivers who were inexperienced at hire (i.e., those
who had to take the full training course oﬀered by the ﬁrm), who were as-
signed to drive solo (as opposed to in a team) on long-haul random dis-
patch runs, and who were in their 5th week to 156th week of tenure with the
ﬁrm.35This gave us more than 100,000 pay-week observations on more than
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33. This is, in part, because the standard algorithms are to and from standard reference
points, and given the circuity of the road network, this undercounts actual miles on average.
It is also because drivers are responsible for selecting a practical route for a large loaded
tractor-trailer, which is often more circuitous than the least-distance version. In addition,
drivers may choose to deviate for other reasons (for example, to run on a turnpike where the
salt trucks will be out at night in the Pennsylvania mountains in winter, as opposed to a non-
toll highway on which such services are more uncertain), as long as they don’t exceed certain
percentage standards for excess miles and meet delivery schedules.
34. For later work, it is expected supplemental information will be added from a separate
operational events data set also maintained by the ﬁrm. It is not the place to start because it
has its own limitations and also because it is about an order of magnitude larger than the pay-
roll data set.
35. Drivers begin receiving mileage pay when they ﬁrst pull a load on their own, without a
trainer in the truck with them, and the earliest this occurs is about the ﬁfth week.2,000 drivers. Examining the key dependent variable, miles per week, we ob-
served very high variance (see ﬁgure 2.5). In particular, there were negative
values and also very high positive values. The former turned out to be due
to mistaken pay being charged back against a driver’s earnings and the lat-
ter to a small number of drivers from the ﬁrm’s early days who were per-
mitted to accumulate vacation earnings over several years and were being
paid upon retirement. We decided to trim the extremes and had to choose
whether to leave in zero-miles weeks or use only positive-miles ones and
what upper bound to use.
The actual maximum number of miles that a solo driver could legally run
during this period, given state speed limits and Federal Hours of Service
Regulations for operators of commercial vehicles, was about 4,000 per
week. But during at least part of this period, until the practice was ended,
some drivers at the ﬁrm were paid for their runs only after they submitted
completed paperwork for each dispatch. This meant that if they held their
paperwork they could have one (or even two) weeks in a row with zero paid
miles and then a week with very high miles. We decided to trim only the
negative values, leaving zero-miles weeks in, and also trimmed values over
6,500 after looking at the distribution of the upper tail.
Further examination showed that almost 20 percent of our observations
were of zero-miles pay weeks. So we ﬁrst trimmed out all the pay-week ob-
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Fig. 2.5 Miles per week by week of driver tenureservations that were associated with any payroll transaction that could ex-
ogenously cause the driver to either miss work or be paid on a nonmileage
basis. This included pay weeks with disability pay, vacation or holiday pay,
salary (sometimes paid to driver-trainers), lump-sum training pay, and the
like. Then we discovered that the payroll system was generating dummy
paychecks for drivers who had separated from the ﬁrm, for several weeks
after separation when the driver left owing money, for example, for things
like cash pay advances or purchases at a store at a company terminal.
When all of these cases were trimmed out, we reduced the number of weeks
with zero miles substantially, but 6 percent of our observations remained
with zero miles per week.
Figure 2.6 exhibits a simple descriptive version of the tenure-
productivity curve for this subset of drivers. Even after all the trimming,
the remaining weeks with zero miles aﬀect the mean values quite signiﬁ-
cantly. Without zero-miles weeks, the initial increase to full productivity is
achieved at about nine months, whereas with zero-miles weeks it is nearer
to a year. There is a sharp drop in the curve at one year of tenure with zero
miles included. This is undoubtedly related in some way to the fact that
drivers with one year of experience can more easily switch ﬁrms and also
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Fig. 2.6 Average miles per week, by week of tenure, with and without 
zero-miles weeksto the fact that most of the drivers in this subset, all of whom have taken
the ﬁrm’s training, assume a debt of several thousand dollars for its cost,
which is forgiven at the end of a year of service after training is completed.36
The balance of the pilot analysis keeps all the zero-miles weeks in the data
set, but a goal of the full statistical case study is to dig deeper into this phe-
nomenon and develop better evidence on whether they all should be in-
cluded when analyzing productivity.
The Impact of Selection on the Tenure-Productivity Curve
A major goal of the statistical investigation of productivity is to analyze
the true causal eﬀect of increasing tenure on expected miles per week (the
treatment eﬀect), while accounting for any impact the high turnover rate
might have (the selection eﬀect). A priori, a reasonable hypothesis would
be that drivers with lower productive capacity would be more likely to leave
at any given level of tenure. In order to test this hypothesis, we start by run-
ning a ﬁxed eﬀects panel data ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
model, with total miles per week as the dependent variable. We use all the
independent variables from the payroll data set that plausibly measure 
exogenous factors that aﬀect productivity. These include driver tenure (a
linear term and as many higher-order terms as prove signiﬁcant) and the
number of dispatches (linear term plus those higher-order terms that prove
signiﬁcant). We also include variables such as the number of short-haul pay
supplements, the number of paid maintenance delays, as well as dummy
variables for each week of the calendar year (to capture any time-period
eﬀects or time trends), and a dummy variable for each terminal at which
drivers are based (to capture any geographic eﬀects of the home base). We
use robust standard errors. The pilot version of this model has an adjusted
R2 of .66.
The ﬁxed eﬀects model constrains the coeﬃcients on all the independent
variables to be the same across all drivers, but permits each driver to have
his or her own regression plane intercept, or constant. This constant, or
ﬁxed eﬀect, which is estimated by the regression, may be thought of as a
measure, speciﬁc to the model and the data, of the degree of “job match”
between the driver and his employment at the ﬁrm. In the context of the
model, it is the number of miles which the driver “brings to the job each
week” (which can be positive or negative), according to the model estimate.
Allowing this speciﬁc ﬂexibility in the regression model provides a statisti-
cal adjustment for the relative speed with which drivers of high and low job
match turn over, in predicting the miles each driver will operate per week.
So we take the predicted values from the model and compute the average
of these values over each week of tenure on the job. These averages, when
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36. New drivers also earn their ﬁrst week of paid vacation at this point, but that cannot be
the reason for the drop in the averages, as those weeks have been removed from the data.graphed, produce a “selection-corrected” tenure-productivity curve. In
ﬁgure 2.7, we compare this new tenure-productivity curve with the simple
descriptive version of the same curve we exhibited in ﬁgure 2.6.37
When both curves are level and the selection-corrected tenure-
productivity curve is below the old curve, the graph suggests that the true
eﬀect of tenure on productivity is smaller than it appears in the simple de-
scriptive case. This implies that drivers with poor job matches are leaving
diﬀerentially faster than those with good ones, which is in accord with our
hypothesis. By contrast, when the selection-corrected tenure-productivity
curve is either rising more rapidly than the old curve, or is above it when
they are level, it says that the true eﬀect of tenure on productivity may be
larger than it appears in the simple descriptive case. This could imply that
drivers with good job matches are leaving diﬀerentially faster than those
with bad ones. The pilot results shown in ﬁgure 2.7 clearly show that our
initial hypothesis is true from about the ninth or tenth month on. But ﬁg-
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37. Both curves are for the case in which zero-miles weeks that cannot be speciﬁcally ex-
plained away are retained in the data set.
Fig. 2.7 The tenure-productivity curve with (AvgMiHatFEStd) and without
(AvgTotMiWkW0) the ﬁxed eﬀects correction for selectionure 2.7 is ambiguous about whether this is also true early in the tenure of
new drivers, when the ﬁrm has its highest rates of separations. A major goal
of the full statistical case study is to clarify these pilot results.
2.6 Research Component Two: Panel Study of New Hires
Research Component Two is a study of 1,069 new driver-trainees who
were among those recruited by the ﬁrm to start their education at a speciﬁc
training school operated by the ﬁrm. The basic design of the panel study is
quite straightforward in conception, although it is quite labor intensive
and costly to carry out. A large amount of data is being collected on each
driver trainee, starting with an initial contact while each was in the ﬁrst
phase of training, and then continuing with follow-up data collections over
two years of the trainee’s work life at the ﬁrm, or until the trainee exits the
ﬁrm, whichever comes ﬁrst.
The follow-up data collections include these elements: (1) a follow-up
paper survey for the driver mailed to his or her home every six months, for
two years, as long as they stay employed by the ﬁrm; (2) an exit survey for
the driver mailed to the driver’s home soon after their separation, if it oc-
curs during the ﬁrst two years; (3) a weekly survey with two questions sent
over the satellite unit to the driver’s truck;38 (4) an initial survey (and con-
sent form) for the driver’s spouse or signiﬁcant other, asking about family/
work-life issues, and mailed to the driver’s family soon after the driver en-
tered the study; (5) a follow-up survey to the driver’s family mailed every
six months up to two years; and (6) an exit survey for the driver’s family
mailed upon driver separation, if it occurs during the ﬁrst two years. As
subjects are informed as they enter the study, a cash gift of $5 is included in
each survey mailing, with the goal of increasing the response rate. Finally,
the drivers’ on-the-job performance data will be collected as part of future
updating of the master data ﬁles for the turnover and productivity studies
of Research Component Two.
2.6.1 The Use of Behavioral Economic Experiments
A central project design goal is to perform a multivariate statistical anal-
ysis of the relationship between all the factors that are being measured and
the success on the job of the trainees, where employee success is measured
ﬁrst by the length of time they are retained by the ﬁrm and, second, by their
productivity on the job.39 While the researchers (and the ﬁrm’s managers)
start with a number of hypotheses about what might matter in predicting
each of these outcome variables, this research component is essentially a
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38. The two questions are: “How happy are you with your job right now?” (Likert scale re-
sponse), and “How many miles do you expect to run next week?”
39. The analysis has the potential to be extended to include safety performance, but that is
not part of the present project.large-scale empirical investigation, designed to let the data tell us which fac-
tors matter statistically and which do not. In this regard, it is particularly ex-
citing that we have the opportunity to employ both traditional measure-
ment instruments and a selected set of behavioral economic experiments.
There are many reasons one might have for doing behavioral economic
experiments in the ﬁeld. But one cross-cutting categorization is whether
the investigation is primarily about treatment eﬀects or about diﬀerences
in individual characteristics. A treatment eﬀect is exactly what it sounds
like: analogous to studying the aggregate diﬀerences in the symptoms of ill
patients who randomly received a speciﬁc medical treatment, as compared
to those who randomly did not, an economic treatment eﬀect is the diﬀer-
ence in aggregate behavior across two variants of the experimental set-
ting.40 An example is the diﬀerence in average transaction prices between
traders in a pit market and those in a double-auction market for the same
commodity and with the same valuations and costs.
However, simple behavioral economic experiments can also be thought
of as measurement tools for the characteristics, including the preferences,
of individual subjects, as argued in Camerer and Fehr (2004). This is the
approach that ﬁts the speciﬁcs of the institutional setting of the Project. We
anticipate that the results we accumulate will provide signiﬁcant evidence
on the relative utility of conventional and experimental measures of indi-
vidual characteristics in predicting on-the-job outcomes and in comple-
menting or substituting for each other.
One methodological point should be noted. We plan to look at the rela-
tionships among the various measures we are collecting on each subject, as
there is little evidence in the literature on this topic for many of our mea-
sures, let alone evidence using the subject population from which we are
drawing our participants. If this were our only goal, it would be important
to vary the order in which the diﬀerent measures are implemented during
the initial data collection, as it is quite possible that order eﬀects could be
important for some of these relationships. Order variations are a standard
feature of many experimental economic designs when individual subjects
take part in more than one experiment.
However, because the central design goal of our project is to examine the
predictive power of the various measures with respect to individual on-the-
job outcomes, a countervailing methodological need is to present—as
nearly as possible—exactly the same set of stimuli to each subject so that
the relationship to the outcome variables is always the same. In addition,
the complexity of administering the data collection process at the ﬁeld site
made it essentially impossible to vary the order, once we found a sequence
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40. Of course, one of the key features which makes experimental evidence the scientiﬁc gold
standard is that random assignment to treatment and nontreatment groups means that any
causal factors not directly controlled for in an eﬀective experimental design wash out of the
results because they equally aﬀect both groups.of data collection events that ﬁt the schedule. For these reasons, the se-
quence of measurements in the initial data collection was not varied.
The initial data collection process took place on a Saturday in the middle
of the ﬁrst two weeks of the training process for new driver trainees. We
next describe the training process to provide context for understanding
where the initial data collection ﬁts in the new driver’s work life.
2.6.2 The Driver Training Process
The ﬁrst two weeks of training for every inexperienced driver take place
at one of the driver training schools maintained by the ﬁrm. The initial
training includes a large dose of classroom work in which students are in-
troduced to the ﬁrm and learn essential facts about the equipment they’ll
be operating, the regulations governing commercial vehicle operators and
operations, map reading and course-plotting, and the safety rules and pro-
cedures speciﬁc to the ﬁrm. It also alternates hands-on training time be-
tween truck simulators and an actual Class 8 tractor-trailer.41Trainees ﬁrst
drive bobtail (tractor with no trailer), and then with an empty and a loaded
trailer, on the school’s property. Once the trainee has qualiﬁed for a CDL
learning permit and is judged ready by the instructors, he or she quickly be-
gins driving on the actual roads and highways surrounding the school, with
a driver-trainer in the right seat of the tractor.
The simulators have two purposes. One is to speed familiarization with
the basic features and operational characteristics of the Class 8 tractor-
trailer. An example is learning how to correctly shift a ten-speed transmis-
sion, which requires frequent double-clutching, coordinated at ﬁrst by con-
scious attention to engine RPMs in comparison to road speed, especially
for downshifts. Another basic feature drivers are ﬁrst exposed to in the sim-
ulator is how to maneuver around corners on city streets with a rig that is
about 65 feet (just under 20 meters) long, and that includes a trailer that is
53-feet (16.2 meters) long. A second main function of the simulators is to
give drivers practice at responding to dangerous settings that could never
be practiced in real life, such as how to avoid going oﬀthe road in response
to a blow-out on a steering axle tire, ﬁrst on dry pavement, and then on
glare ice on a freeway in the middle of car traﬃc.
Trainees who complete the initial two-week training process are oﬃ-
cially hired by the ﬁrm on their date of completion, after passing a basic
skills qualiﬁcation test. Once hired, the driver goes back to his or her home
base at one of the ﬁrm’s terminal locations. While the content of the CDL
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41. By deﬁnition, Class 8 vehicles that can operate on the National Highway System (NHS)
have a maximum GVW of between 33,000 pounds and 80,000 pounds. The units utilized by
most truckload carriers, including the cooperating ﬁrm, are at the top of this range, and have
a maximum GVW of 80,000 pounds. (The NHS is a large subset of all U.S. highways desig-
nated by the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT), on which federal size and weight
standards prevail.)exam is federally regulated, the exact rules governing driver training vary
from state to state.42 So depending on their proﬁciency level and on the
state in which they will be based, trainees may also take the CDL exam at
the training school, or they may do so later, at a location nearer their home
base. Whether they have the CDL yet or are still using a learner’s permit,
all new drivers have a second training phase, during which the trainee
works for between one and three more weeks, actually hauling freight from
their home base, but with a certiﬁed driver trainer in the right seat of the
tractor. When the trainer judges the trainee ready (and he or she has ac-
quired a CDL), the new driver is assigned a tractor of his or her own and
goes to work on his or her own.
As is mentioned in previous sections, it is typical for the TL carriers that
train all or most of their new drivers to oﬀer the training on a credit con-
tract. The contract speciﬁes that the trainees assume a debt of several thou-
sand dollars, which is approximately the market value of the training. Ac-
cording to the contract, the ﬁrm provides both phases of the training,
including access to the classroom, instructors, and trucks, plus needed
classroom supplies. For the ﬁrst phase of training, transportation to and
from the training school, a hotel room while at training, and lunches dur-
ing the training day are also covered. The trainee owes no payments on the
credit extended as long as they stay employed by the ﬁrm, and the debt is
fully discharged if the trainee completes a speciﬁc period of service after
the point they begin working on their own (either one year, at many ﬁrms,
including this one, or eighteen months at some others). Trainees who do
not complete the period of service, however, become legally liable for re-
payment of the amount of credit extended.
2.6.3 The Initial Data Collection Process
The initial data collection process was piloted in October through De-
cember, 2005, and went to full operation on twenty-two Saturdays during
January through August, 2006. The school starts a class into the initial two-
week training process (described in the preceding section) every week on
Sunday (thus, two classes are in residence at any given time). So trainees in
target classes received a one-page ﬂier advertising the study as part of their
orientation on their ﬁrst day at school. The ﬂier explained the opportunity
to take part in the University of Minnesota study the next weekend and
that trainees who volunteered could expect to earn cash by participating.
At the beginning of the class day on the Saturday of data collection, Burks
conducted an informed consent process in which he introduced himself as
a former driver turned university researcher and explained the goals and
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42. The CDL comes in three categories, “Class C” through “Class A,” and for freight ve-
hicles are diﬀerentiated primarily by the ascending maximum GVW of the trucks the bearer
can operate. The Class A CDL is required to operate Class 8 vehicles on public roads.procedures of the study to the potential subjects. The study is governed by
the standards of the Human Subjects Protection Committee of the Uni-
versity of Minnesota’s Institutional Review Board (IRB), so a formal con-
sent document was used which spelled out the risks and beneﬁts of taking
part in the study.43
The data collection at the training school was set up as two, two-hour-
long blocks, spent doing tasks with the researchers, either on computers or
with paper and pencil, with a short break in between. Training classes
range from thirty-ﬁve to seventy students, and the largest group that could
be accommodated at one time for data collection was thirty-two subjects,
so each class was broken into two groups. The ﬁrst group worked with the
researchers from early to late morning, and the second group from late
morning to midafternoon. On data collection days, the class day was struc-
tured so that those potential subjects who chose not to take part did not
have extra training available, but instead could spend the extra time in the
break room. The buses that transport students to and from the hotel bring
everyone at one time in the early morning and take everyone back at one
time in the afternoon. Given the monetary compensation being oﬀered, the
relatively low opportunity cost of taking part, and the credible guaran-
tee of conﬁdentiality from the University, 91 percent of the trainees oﬀered
the opportunity chose to join the study. Initial data was collected from
1,069 participants, with clean information on 1,036 of these.44
Except for one instrument (the Educational Testing Service’s test of
Quantitative Literacy, labeled “Numeracy” in our schedule), all the instru-
ments were administered on a wireless network provided by the cooperat-
ing ﬁrm of refurbished Dell notebook computers, with a newer Dell note-
book as the master controlling computer. The software used was z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007), the toolbox for constructing computer-administered
economic experiments and surveys developed at the Institute for Empiri-
cal Economics at the University of Zürich.45The data collection took place
in a temporary computerized experimental economics laboratory that the
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43. This document included the following key facts: (1) the kind of data collection activi-
ties involved, both initially and later, (2) that subjects would receive $20 in initial cash “thank
you gifts” for taking part, and have the opportunity to earn substantially more, (3) that the
money paid to them was coming not from the ﬁrm but from two nonproﬁt foundations, (4)
that under university rules for protecting research participants, the new data collected about
them would be kept conﬁdential from everyone except academic investigators approved by
the Institutional Review Board (IRB), including speciﬁcally that it would never be available
to their managers at the trucking ﬁrm, and (5) that participation was completely voluntary.
44. Due to a programming glitch, one item, Hit 15 Points, has valid information for only
893 subjects.
45. Because we are running a licensed adaptation of a nonverbal IQ instrument that re-
quires the display of a large number of graphics ﬁles, each of which is a scanned image of a
page with a pattern-matching task, we ran a beta version of z-Tree that was extended to
handle graphics ﬁles. Our special thanks to developer Urs Fischbacher for providing this new
version in time for our project.research team set up in one of the classrooms at the training school on the
Friday before the data collection dates on Saturdays, and which was then
removed at the end of the Saturday event. The team hand-built a set of
cloth dividers hung from frames adapted from portable garment racks,
which were installed between all the computer stations in order to separate
subjects during the data collection. Because the data collection sessions ex-
ceeded the endurance of notebook PC batteries, extra power outlets were
installed in the walls and a set of portable extension cords were deployed as
part of the laboratory set up. The wireless network was part of a virtual lo-
cal area network (VLAN) set up by the ﬁrm’s IT support personnel under
a data security agreement approved by the University of Minnesota Hu-
man Subjects Committee. The VLAN separated the computers on which
the conﬁdential data was being collected from the rest of the ﬁrm’s network
and provided secure data storage until the initial data collection was com-
plete, and the project moved back to the UMM campus.
Table 2.2 shows the time sequence and schedule for the actual data col-
lection event of February 25, 2006. This class of trainees was relatively
large, at ﬁfty-nine students. Fifty-one out of ﬁfty-six, or 91 percent, chose
to take part.
While it was theoretically possible for a subject to end up with only the
initial $20 “thank you gifts,” we always paid at least a dollar or two more.
The actual payouts depended in part on the use of stochastic devices (plas-
tic bowls ﬁlled with colored or numbered poker chips), as described in the
following account of each data collection activity. The average total earn-
ings for the four-hour period of the initial data collection were $53, with a
minimum of $21, and a maximum of $168. By design, we wanted most sub-
jects to be pleased about their initial interaction with the researchers, given
the follow-up contacts with them which are called for by the design.
The latter fact—that we needed to gain not only the immediate but also
the longer-term cooperation of our subjects—also aﬀected the protocol
for subject behavior during the four-and-one-half-hour sequence of data
events. With undergraduate students in a university experimental econom-
ics laboratory and with a protocol that takes signiﬁcantly less time than the
project’s, it is not hard to ask subjects to be quiet, to not speak to their
neighbors, to not do other tasks on the computers, and not to read, write,
or use cell phones or PDAs. In order to provide a neutral setting, this is the
behavior requested—and normally received from—typical student sub-
jects in economic experiments, unless the treatment being investigated is
one involving changing some aspect of this, such as allowing speciﬁc types
of communication. We established expectations of our driver-trainee par-
ticipants that were similar to this, but found that to receive willing compli-
ance we had to allow for participants who ﬁnished ahead of others on tasks
that took a long time to get up and leave the lab setting temporarily. We did
this explicitly during the Numeracy instrument and during the MPQ in-
78 Stephen V. Burks et al.Table 2.2 Data collection activity time allocations: February 25, 2006
Actual Scheduled Total
time time time Informed consent process
7:13 7:10 Start informed consent process
59 How many people in the room?
7:29 7:30 0:16 Finish informed consent process
Session 1a
7:30 7:30 0:09 Check-in
7:39 7:40 0:04 Information
7:43 7:42 0:19 Activity 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
Computer generated: Pay on beliefs for what percentage of people
will send $5 as person 1, how much person 2 sends if person 1 sends
$0, and how much person 2 sends if person 1 sends $5, $1 each
8:02 8:09 0:39 Activity 2: Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire
No payment
8:41 8:47 0:12 Activity 3: Risk/Loss Aversion
1 question, #23; green by drawing out of a bowl; everyone paid for
their selection
8:53 8:58 0:27 Activity 4: Demographics
No payment
9:16 Activity 5: Big Red Button
Computer generated
Release participants
9:09 First person left at this time
9:20 9:26 Last person left at this time
Session 2a
9:37 9:40 0:08 Check-in
9:45 9:45 0:02 Information
9:47 9:47 0:09 Activity 1: Time Preferences
2 subjects, #12 and #19; 1 question, #18
9:56 9:57 0:47 Activity 2: Nonverbal IQ
Start time of test 10:02
2 subjects, #8 and #21; pay $1 for each correct answer; pay on
“pre” and “post” beliefs, $2 each
10:43 10:30 0:25 Activity 3: Numeracy (Quantitative Literacy)
Start time of test 10:44
2 subjects, #8 and #18; pay $2 for each correct answer; pay on
“pre” and “post” beliefs, $2 each
11:08 10:55 0:08 Activity 4: Ambiguity Aversion
1 question, #7; blue by drawing out of a bowl; everyone paid for
their selection
11:16 11:05 0:12 Activity 5: Hit 15 Points
Computer generated
11:28 11:28 0:12 Activity 6: Risk, Impatience, and Cooperation Survey
No payment
Release Participants
11:35 First person left at this time
11:40 11:40 Last person left at this time
(continued)Session 1b
12:15 12:30 0:10 Check-in
12:25 12:40 0:03 Information
12:28 12:42 0:23 Activity 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
Computer generated; pay on beliefs for what percentage of people
will send $5 as person 1, how much person 2 sends if person 1 sends
$0, and how much person 2 sends if person 1 sends $5, $1 each
12:51 1:09 0:35 Activity 2: Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire
No payment
1:34 1:47 0:13 Activity 3: Risk/Loss Aversion
1 question, #21; blue by drawing out of a bowl; everyone paid for
their selection
1:47 1:58 0:32 Activity 4: Demographics
No payment
2:16 Activity 5: Big Red Button
Computer generated
Release participants
2:04 First person left at this time
2:19 2:26 Last person left at this time
Session 2b
2:25 2:40 0:09 Check-in
2:34 2:45 0:02 Information
2:36 2:47 0:11 Activity 1: Time Preferences
2 subjects, #17 and #16; 1 question, #7
2:47 2:57 0:39 Activity 2: Nonverbal IQ
Start time of test 2:53
2 subjects, #17 and #22; pay $1 for each correct answer; pay on
“pre” and “post” beliefs, $2 each
3:26 3:30 0:28 Activity 3: Numeracy (Quantitative Literacy)
Start time of test 3:30
2 subjects, #17 and #16; pay $2 for each correct answer; pay on
“pre” and “post” beliefs, $2 each
3:54 3:55 0:11 Activity 4: Ambiguity Aversion
1 question, #22; blue by drawing out of a bowl; everyone paid for
their selection
4:05 4:05 0:16 Activity 5: Hit 15 Points
Computer generated
4:21 4:28 0:16 Activity 6: Risk, Impatience, and Cooperation Survey
No payment
Release participants
4:29 First person left at this time
4:37 4:40 Last person left at this time
Table 2.2 (continued)
Actual Scheduled Total
time time time Informed consent processstrument, when diﬀerences in reading speed made the diﬀerences in com-
pletion time especially large, and we also allowed participants to read af-
ter completion if they were done early during the MPQ.
We next turn to a brief description of each item in the sequence of data
collection events.
2.6.4 Session One Data Collection Events
The ﬁrst two-hour block of data collection activities consists of three be-
havioral economic experiments and two more conventional measures.
Prisoner’s Dilemma
Our version of this experiment is a sequential and strategic one. Person
1 (the ﬁrst mover) and Person 2 (the second mover) each are allocated $5.
Person 1 can send either $0 or $5 to Person 2, and Person 2 can respond by
sending $0, $1, $2, $3, $4, or $5 back. All funds sent are doubled by the re-
searchers. Each subject provides their complete strategy in the game: they
make both an unconditional decision for the ﬁrst-mover role and a condi-
tional one for the second-mover role (ﬁrst, how to respond to being sent $0
and, second, how to respond to being sent $5, doubled to $10.) Subjects are
randomly matched and their role selected by the computer after their deci-
sions. This is a variant of the task used in Burks, Carpenter, and Götte
(2006).
Before each decision screen, subjects are also asked how they think other
participants in the room will act in this experiment. The ﬁrst question is
“What percent of the participants do you think will send their $5 as Person
1?” and pays $1 if the subject is correct within plus or minus 5 percent. The
second and third questions are “If Person 1 does not send/does send, what
is the average that participants in this room will send back?” and pays $1
for each question if the subject is within plus or minus $0.25 of the actual
average.
There will be four main data items of potential interest from this exper-
iment: ﬁrst-mover choices, the estimate of ﬁrst-mover behavior of others,
second-mover conditional choices, and the estimate of the second-mover
choices of others. We intend to analyze what other factors about the par-
ticipants predict their choices in this experiment, as well as use some as-
pects of their choices as predictors of other experimental responses, and
also of some kinds of on-the-job behavior. A potential workplace applica-
tion is in predicting on-the-job cooperation. The TL driver’s job is rela-
tively individualized, but there are two instances in which the data store
from Research Component One may in the future be augmented to permit
the construction of an on-the-job measure of cooperation.46
One of the beneﬁts of the strategic form of this experiment is that the
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46. See appendix B, items 4.1 and 4.2.second-mover choices provide a fairly clear typing of the respondents, in
terms of who is an egoist (never sends anything to the ﬁrst mover), who is
a conditional cooperator (sends back exactly what the ﬁrst mover sent),
and who is an altruist (always sends everything), with some gradations pos-
sible for intermediate dollar responses. As ﬁgure 2.8shows, participant be-
havior is varied in this experiment, but “pure” versions of these three
strategies predominate among second movers (shown by the large circles,
which are sized proportionally to the number of respondent choices they
capture). The three pure strategies make up 61 percent of the total re-
sponses, and most of the rest are intermediate responses. Those responses
below and to the right of the 45-degree line fall in the “wingnut” category;
these participants may have misunderstood the instructions, a hypothesis
we can test by correlating these responses with some of our measures of
cognitive performance.
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ)
The Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (Patrick, Curtin, and
Tellegan 2002), otherwise known as the MPQ, is the second measurement
instrument. This is a standard personality proﬁle that consists of eleven
diﬀerent scales that represent primary trait dimensions: well-being, social
potency, achievement, social closeness, stress reaction, alienation, aggres-
sion, control, harm avoidance, traditionalism, and absorption. The short
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Fig. 2.8 Second-mover strategies in the sequential prisoner’s dilemmaversion used in the study has 154 multiple-choice questions. Almost all of
the 154 questions have the same four possible answers: “Always True,”
“Mostly True,” “Mostly False,” and “Always False.” There is no separate
payment for this survey.
A principal use of this scale will be to generate a set of control variables
in regression modeling of on-the-job outcomes. We also expect to look at
how the traits deﬁned by the MPQ relate to answers to the other survey 
instruments and to behavior in the experiments. As ﬁgure 2.9 shows, the
trainee drivers are similar overall to the benchmark population presented
in Patrick, Curtin, and Tellegan (2002), which is promising given that our
primary goal is to use the variation across individuals in the components
of the MPQ. Some initial hypotheses, for instance, are that high “achieve-
ment” orientation should be correlated with job success as a TL driver, es-
pecially given the incentive-pay method faced by these drivers. One note-
worthy point is the apparent diﬀerence from the population in the factor
“unlikely virtues.” The questions in this factor are set up so that only some-
one who is “too good to be true” will have a high score, and the authors of
the instrument intend it as a check on the truthfulness of the subject’s re-
Using Behavioral Economic Field Experiments at a Firm 83
Fig. 2.9 Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire proﬁle of subjects compared
to MPQ reference population proﬁlesponses. This MPQ factor oﬀers the prospect that we may be able to con-
trol for this eﬀect to some degree in multivariate analysis by using the un-
likely virtues score as a regressor.
Risk/Loss Aversion
In the risk/loss aversion experiment, there are twenty-four questions
that are divided into four blocks of six questions each (see table 2.3). There
are two possible choices for each question, an amount of money received
with certainty, and a 50/50 gamble that pays a higher dollar amount if
“your color” is chosen and a lower dollar amount if the “other color” is
chosen. To avoid any hint of experimenter control over the outcome, sub-
jects choose which color (blue or green) is theirs for the random outcomes
as their last response.
Each of the four blocks of six questions follows the same format. In each
block, the amount for “your color” and the “other color” do not change,
and the amount of the “for sure” option increases by $0.50 per question.
The design is intended to identify where the subject crosses over from the
“for sure” option to the “gamble” option, relative to where a risk-neutral
person would do so. After all subjects have made their decisions, one poker
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Table 2.3 Risk/loss aversion
Question no. For sure Your color Other color
1 Win $2.00 Win $10.00 Win $2.00
2 Win $3.00 Win $10.00 Win $2.00
3 Win $4.00 Win $10.00 Win $2.00
4 Win $5.00 Win $10.00 Win $2.00
5 Win $6.00 Win $10.00 Win $2.00
6 Win $7.00 Win $10.00 Win $2.00
7 Win $0.00 Win $5.00 Lose $1.00
8 Win $0.50 Win $5.00 Lose $1.00
9 Win $1.00 Win $5.00 Lose $1.00
10 Win $1.50 Win $5.00 Lose $1.00
11 Win $2.00 Win $5.00 Lose $1.00
12 Win $2.50 Win $5.00 Lose $1.00
13 Lose $2.50 Win $1.00 Lose $5.00
14 Lose $2.00 Win $1.00 Lose $5.00
15 Lose $1.50 Win $1.00 Lose $5.00
16 Lose $1.00 Win $1.00 Lose $5.00
17 Lose $0.50 Win $1.00 Lose $5.00
18 Lose $0.00 Win $1.00 Lose $5.00
19 Win $1.00 Win $5.00 Win $1.00
20 Win $1.50 Win $5.00 Win $1.00
21 Win $2.00 Win $5.00 Win $1.00
22 Win $2.50 Win $5.00 Win $1.00
23 Win $3.00 Win $5.00 Win $1.00
24 Win $3.50 Win $5.00 Win $1.00chip is drawn by a participant that identiﬁes which question (one through
twenty-four) everyone will be paid on, and then a second participant draws
a colored chip to determine whether the winning color, for subjects who
chose the gamble on the selected question, is green or blue.
The choice blocks overlap the zero-dollar point in order to allow infer-
ence about the likelihood that the implied utility function has diﬀerent
slopes in the positive and negative domains. But there is no set of choices
only in the negative domain because the project is relying on the long-term
responsiveness of participants, and pilot work showed that a choice block
fully in the negative domain was perceived as too unfriendly a task.
Figure 2.10 shows the distribution of the total number of risky choices
for our subject pool and shows that there is signiﬁcant variation across par-
ticipants, which is desirable for the purpose of using the variations across
individuals to predict other behavior. Risk aversion and/or loss aversion
are potentially key explanatory factors in TL ﬁrm turnover because nearly
all of each driver’s pay is based on piece rates (cents per mile for a ﬁxed
number of miles for each dispatch). Paychecks can vary quite substantially
from one week to the next, and, thus, there is a certain level of short-run ﬁ-
nancial risk that goes with the job. The question for the study is to what ex-
tent this form of experimental measurement of ﬁnancial risk is predictive
of the impact of pay ﬂuctuations on driver turnover, as compared to things
such as survey responses and credit score.
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Fig. 2.10 The total number of risky choicesDemographics
This instrument is a compilation of thirty-seven demographic questions.
The types of questions vary, but the areas that are covered include educa-
tion level, languages, marital status, previous job experience, family life-
style, racial or ethnic identity, country of birth, how many people are in the
household, household income, and networking done while at training.
These questions are mostly multiple choice, with a few numerical answer
questions as well. There is no separate payment for completing this demo-
graphic questionnaire.
Figure 2.11 shows the distribution of ages of the trainee drivers, as com-
pared to the distribution among blue-collar workers, as computed from the
March 2005 Current Population Survey. The minimum age to acquire the
CDL is twenty-one, so there are no new trainees that are less than this min-
imum age. However, in general the trainee pool is similar in distribution to
the entire population of blue-collar workers in the United States, albeit
with a modest shift toward the age range of twenty-one to thirty.
Figure 2.12 shows the distribution of the highest education level com-
pleted among the trainee drivers, with the distribution among blue-collar
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Fig. 2.11 Distribution of participant age with benchmarkworkers in the United States as a comparison. The minimum literacy re-
quirements for the TL driver job are undoubtedly the reason there are very
few trainees with very low educational attainment, compared to the blue-
collar workforce in the United States. It is interesting that the trainee group
has a much higher proportion of individuals with some college, but possi-
bly a lower proportion with a junior college or technical degree, as com-
pared to the population of blue-collar workers. Given that someone who
has acquired some level of useful education in college is overqualiﬁed for
this job, this pattern is consistent with the view that completing a two-year
degree is indeed correlated with job market success as fewer of these indi-
viduals are in our subject pool. A speculation about the apparently slightly
higher proportion of four-year-degree holders in the trainee group, as
compared to the benchmark, is that these are folks with other options who
are attracted (at least initially) by the TL-driver lifestyle.
The Red Button
This experiment is designed to measure short-term impatience. It is the
last data collection event in the ﬁrst of the two, two-hour sessions, and it is
followed by ten to twenty minutes of break time, during which participants
can use the restroom and stretch their legs and get something from the
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Fig. 2.12 Participant education levels with benchmarkvending machines if they wish. It is directly preceded by the demographic
questionnaire, to which it is linked. This means that, unlike most of the
other instruments, subjects do not have to wait until everyone else com-
pletes the prior activity, but instead each participant can start the red but-
ton task as soon as he or she has individually completed the demographic
questionnaire. This setup is designed to minimize peer eﬀects in the red
button task as each subject will start the task at a diﬀerent time.
The red button activity takes exactly ten minutes, and the task is to wait
quietly until a timer on the task screen counts down from 600 seconds to
zero. As described in section 2.6.3, during each session subjects are re-
quested in general to either work on the task at hand or wait quietly. We ask
that they do not to talk to their neighbors, nor engage in any other activity,
such as pulling out something to read. During the red button task, these
rules are quite strictly enforced. Participants are paid $5 if they complete
the task by waiting the full ten minutes. However, subjects may choose to
end this experiment earlier if they wish. Each click of a button below the
countdown clock on the computer screen, which is labeled “Reduce Wait-
ing Time,” will cut the individual’s waiting time—but each click also costs
them $1. The ﬁrst click reduces the waiting time by ﬁve minutes; the second
click reduces the waiting time by three more minutes, and the third click re-
duces the waiting time by an additional two minutes. Once the timer says
zero, no matter how long the subject has waited, then he or she is free to get
up and leave the room for break time. As ﬁgure 2.13 shows, 29 percent of
the participants clicked at least once. This is actually lower than we aimed
for; our initial calibration runs may have led us to set the opportunity cost
of the ﬁrst click too high.
Patience is relevant to quit decisions, and being impatient can lead to
poor job performance when a signiﬁcant part of the job involves being able
to wait on customer docks and then hurry up when customers are ready.
Being patient in traﬃc is also a relevant job skill. We expect to investigate
the extent to which red button choices will predict impatience on the job,
as measured by quit decisions, controlling for prior earnings and prior
waiting time during the earlier data collection activities.
2.6.5 Session Two Data Collection Events
The second two-hour block of data collection activities contains three
behavioral economic experiments and three more conventional measures.
Time Preferences
In this experiment, there are twenty-eight questions that are divided into
four blocks of seven questions each. There are two possible choices for
each question: a smaller amount of money paid sooner, and a larger
amount of money paid later. Each of the four blocks of seven questions fol-
lows the same format. The amount for the higher payoﬀat a later date is al-
88 Stephen V. Burks et al.ways $80, and the amount for the lower payoﬀ at an earlier time begins at
$75 and decreases by $5 intervals to $45. The point at which a subject
switches from the later payoﬀ to the earlier one (if a switch is made) pro-
vides an implicit point estimate of the subject’s discount rate over that time
horizon.
The time frames are (1) today (Saturday) versus Monday; (2) today ver-
sus next Thursday; (3) Monday versus Monday plus one week, and (4)
Monday versus Monday plus four weeks. The two matched pairs of time
frames are designed to allow subjects that have diﬀerent discount rates for
choices with and without a front-end delay, that is, with and without an ini-
tial delay for both payments.47After all subjects have made their decisions,
a participant draws one poker chip to select which of the twenty-eight
questions will be activated, and then two poker chips are chosen the same
way which identify two of the subjects in the session who will be paid for
their choices on that question. Payments are, of course, made on the dates
requested, either in person, or with an oﬃcial bank check mailed in a Uni-
versity of Minnesota envelope.
As ﬁgure 2.14 shows, the three modes of the distribution of future
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47. The contrast between choices in which one option is an immediate payment versus those
in which both payments involve a delay will permit us to observe “impatience for immediate
results,” often described in the literature as quasi-hyperbolic discounting, if it should appear.
Fig. 2.13 Clicks to reduce waiting time at a costchoices are at zero, fourteen, and all, with a median of seventeen future
choices out of a possible twenty-eight. There is a wide dispersion in indi-
vidual responses. We expect to examine the relationship between this mea-
sure and such other measures as nonverbal IQ, risk/loss aversion, and im-
patience. And we will investigate the extent to which it adds predictive
power to our statistical models of quits.
Nonverbal IQ
The IQ instrument used is a computerized adaptation of the Standard
Progressive Matrices by J.C. Raven (Raven, Raven, and Court 2000); the
authors created the adaptation under license from The Psychological Cor-
poration.48Each question is presented as a graphic image. On top is a large
rectangular box containing some kind of a pattern with a piece missing out
of the lower right hand corner. On the bottom are six (or eight) possible
pieces that could be used to complete the image on top. Each section starts
with easy images and gets progressively more diﬃcult.
The original instrument consists of ﬁve sections, each containing twelve
questions. Our version is not fully comparable to the standard results for
the instrument because we are actively administering only the last four sec-
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48. Pilot work was done with two other instruments, but one had irresolvable licensing is-
sues, and the other proved unsuitable for our setting. The ﬁrst several administrations of the
Raven’s instrument were done with paper and pencil, while we arranged the license for the
computerized adaptation (used by permission of Harcourt Assessment).
Fig. 2.14 Total future choicestions, due to time constraints. The original is primarily benchmarked in an
untimed format, and we cut our subjects oﬀ after thirty-one minutes, hav-
ing given a warning three minutes earlier.49 The simplest way to match our
data with the untimed reference benchmarks is to note that everyone in our
subject pool ﬁnished the fourth section before the announcement of a time
limit. Our correction is then simply to multiply our subjects’ scores on sec-
tions two, three, and four by 5/3 to scale them up to the same range as the
score for untimed subjects doing all ﬁve sections.50
After both verbal and written instructions and two practice questions,
subjects ﬁll out a “conﬁdence question” that asks them how they think
they will do as compared to other subjects in the room, by placing them-
selves in the correct quintile of the distribution of scores. When the Raven’s
task has been completed, the same conﬁdence question is asked again.
Subjects are paid an additional $2 for placing themselves in the correct
quintile. In addition, two subjects are randomly chosen to be paid $1 per
correct answer, for total possible earnings of $48 each for their question an-
swers. Starting at about subject 200, we also began asking whether subjects
want to ﬁnd out their own score and the group average when they receive
their payout.51
Figure 2.15shows approximately how our panel compares to a standard
benchmark population (citizens of Iowa City, IA, in the late 1990s.) On a
scale of 0 to 60, our subject pool has a higher density between 36 and 44,
and a lower one from 54 on up. The median for our subjects is about two
points lower than that for the benchmark population. The distribution
looks reasonable compared to groups of workers in other countries against
which the regular version of the instrument has been benchmarked. The
primary use of this measure in the project analysis will be as a control vari-
able in predicting on-the-job outcomes. But we also expect to look at the
relationships between this indicator of nonverbal IQ and the other partic-
ipant characteristics that we measure. We will also examine how IQ, conﬁ-
dence about one’s performance both before and after the task, and the de-
sire for full information about one’s performance are related.
Numeracy (Quantitative Literacy)
This instrument is part of the test of adult quantitative literacy from the
Educational Testing Service. The full instrument consists of two sections, of
which only the ﬁrst section was used here, due to time constraints. The sec-
tion is made up of twelve questions and subjects are given exactly twenty
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49. There is one published benchmark from a French subject pool using a thirty-minute
time limit, but including all ﬁve sections.
50. This approach produces unbiased estimates at the cost of greater variance.
51. The two selected to be paid for correct answers will learn their score from their payoﬀ,
so they will just get the average as new information, but these two subjects are selected after
this question is asked.minutes to complete the test. The test requires subjects to be able to add,
subtract, compare numbers, compute a percentage, ﬁll out a form, and to
be able to read and understand a short problem, among other things.
As with the nonverbal IQ, after instructions and a brief practice ques-
tion, subjects ﬁll out a “conﬁdence question” that asks them how they
think they will do as compared to other subjects in the room, by quintiles.
When the numeracy task has been completed, the same conﬁdence ques-
tion is asked again. Subjects are paid an additional $2 for placing them-
selves in the correct quintile. Two subjects are randomly chosen to be paid
$2 per correct answer, for total possible earnings of $24 each for their ques-
tion answers. In addition, at about subject 200 we began asking whether
subjects want to ﬁnd out their own score and the group average when they
receive their payment.52
The distribution is not directly comparable to the distribution for the full
instrument (i.e., when both sections are administered), but we appear to be
getting good dispersion in performance (see ﬁgure 2.16). The mean score
is 71 percent. The primary use of this in the project analysis will be as a con-
trol variable in predicting on-the-job outcomes. The job of TL driver re-
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52. As with the nonverbal IQ indicator, the two selected to be paid for correct answers will
learn their score from their payoﬀ, so they will just get the average as new information, but
these two subjects are selected after this question is asked.
Fig. 2.15 Density of (adapted) nonverbal IQ instrument scores for drivers com-
pared to density of benchmark population scoresquires continual application of numeracy skills, for example, in map read-
ing and route planning, or in calculating hours remaining and hours com-
ing available at speciﬁc future times, under the hours of service regulations
for commercial motor vehicle operators. But we also expect to look at the
relationships between this indicator of numeracy and the other participant
characteristics that we measure. We will also examine how numeracy, con-
ﬁdence about one’s performance both before and after the task, and the de-
sire for full information about one’s performance are related.
Ambiguity Aversion
Our ambiguity aversion experiment is identical to the risk/loss aversion
experiment described in section 2.6.4, except for one detail: it is no longer
known to be a 50/50 gamble if the subject chooses the uncertain option.
Two blue poker chips and two green poker chips are placed in the bowl
from which the winning color is drawn, and then out of sight of the sub-
jects, six more chips are added that can be all green, all blue, or any mix-
ture thereof. As a result, subjects only know that there is at least a 20 per-
cent chance that green will be drawn and at least a 20 percent chance that
blue will be drawn. All other features of the experiment are unchanged:
there are four panels of six choices each, with the dollar values for certain
and lottery outcomes as before. All subjects choose the certain payoﬀ or
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Fig. 2.16 Distribution of numeracy scoresthe lottery in each question in each panel and then which color is theirs for
the lottery outcomes.
Figure 2.17 shows results for the ﬁrst panel, when the choice is between
a ﬁxed amount ranging from $2.00 to $7.00 or a lottery with outcomes of
$2 or $10. The horizontal axis shows the total number of lotteries chosen
in the initial risk/loss aversion task, while the vertical axis shows the same
total for the ambiguous version. Participants who made the same choices
in both cases would be on the 45-degree line. The size of the circles shows
the number of participants at each node of the grid, and it is apparent that
many subjects did change the number of lotteries they selected in widely
varying ways. We will be looking to see which subjects choose more or
fewer risky options and whether their shift, if any, is related to other ex-
perimental or survey measures and to on-the-job success.
Hit 15 Points
This is a backward induction, or planning, task in the form of a small
game between subject and computer. The computer and the subject take
turns adding points to the “points basket,” and during each turn, the sub-
ject or the computer must add either one, two, or three points to the points
basket. The goal is to be the player to add exactly the ﬁfteenth point. The
number of points in the points basket at the beginning of the round varies,
and the computer and participant take turns going ﬁrst. The ﬁrst round is
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Fig. 2.17 Ambiguity and lottery choiceset so as to give the subjects an example of how the ﬁrst stage of backward
induction works. Before each decision is made by the subject as to what
number of points they want to add to the points basket, the subject is asked
whether he or she will win or if the computer will win. The subjects are paid
$1 for each round that they win.
Figure 2.18 shows the distribution of scores on this task. The median
falls between two and three correct rounds of the game.53 Together with
numeracy, we anticipate that this measure will be predictive of on-the-job
success, and especially of high versus low productivity. The TL truck driv-
ers have to do numerical backward induction every day, to calculate back
from routing and delivery goals that are from a few hours to a few days
ahead, in order to decide on the optimal course of action in the present.
One regularly used application is in ﬁguring out how many hours they need
to get to their destination and how many hours they have available to drive
under the regulations governing the hours of service for commercial ve-
hicle operators.
Risk, Impatience, and Cooperation Survey
The last instrument used during the Saturday initial data collection
events with the panel study participants is a list of attitude questions about
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53. As mentioned earlier, the N is 893 for this task, as we discovered a programming error
in the z-Tree code for the game after 176 subjects had already taken part.
Fig. 2.18 Success in the Hit 15 Points gamerisk preferences, patience and impatience, and cooperation. It was assem-
bled from a selection of papers in the literature that propose various survey-
response measures for these characteristics of subjects. We intend these to
also be tried out as control variables in order to see if they are useful and, if
so, whether they are substitutes or complements to the experimental mea-
sures in predicting behavior on other measures and on-the-job success.
2.6.6 Other Measures of Interest
The applicant information collected by the cooperating ﬁrm on trainees
provides a few other data items of interest. There is an indicator of whether
the participant is a smoker (whether the trainee requested a hotel room in
which smoking is permitted during initial training). This may turn out to
be related to risk attitudes. In addition, because the trainees apply for
credit for the training contract, the ﬁrm is able to supply us with a credit
score. We want to examine the relationships among our measures of risk/
loss aversion, ambiguity aversion, time preference, and impatience, on the
one hand, and the credit score, on the other. We also are interested in de-
termining whether the credit score useful in predicting on-the-job success,
and, if so, whether it is a complement or substitute for our other measures.
2.7 Some Implications of the Truckers and Turnover Project
The present chapter has presented the context and design of the Truck-
ers and Turnover Project at a stage when much of the initial data collection
has taken place, but while follow-up data is still being collected and before
results have become available. The proof of this pudding will, of course, be
in the eating, when data collection is complete and results are available. But
there are three points that can be made about the project at this stage. The
ﬁrst two are about research methodology, and the third is about the policy
signiﬁcance of the subjects of the project.
2.7.1 For the Industry Studies Community
First, for the industry studies research community, the project stands as
a kind of “proof of concept” for adding behavioral economic experiments
to the already rich mix of data collection techniques it utilizes. The Sloan
Foundation’s Web site states that the Foundation’s goal in supporting in-
dustry studies is “to build a strong community of industry studies scholars
who contribute to academia, to industries, and to government.” Along
with an interdisciplinary approach, the deﬁning feature of this work ac-
cording to the Foundation is that “industry studies scholars develop a deep
understanding of particular industries by grounding their research in di-
rect observation” (2007). The conventional tools for direct observation
range from in-depth participant observation, to shorter structured site vis-
its and interviews, to the collection of proprietary internal data for statisti-
cal analysis. To this list, the Truckers and Turnover Project prospectively
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ing an existing cooperative research relationship between academics and
ﬁrm(s), is to design the behavioral experiments to ﬁt the speciﬁc insti-
tutional and business context. The new data-collection techniques must
both complement more traditional approaches and also must credibly add
value, from both an academic and a business standpoint. In this regard, the
essentially individualized production process of TL motor freight is espe-
cially suited for an initial exploration of the uses of experiments that mea-
sure individual characteristics of employees. But one can easily imagine
more complex social dilemma experiments being applied in teamwork em-
ployment settings, for instance.54
2.7.2 For the Experimental and Behavioral Economics Communities
Second, for the behavioral and experimental economics communities,
the project also stands as a kind of “proof of concept” for the speciﬁc man-
ner of applying behavioral experiments to the workplace used. As men-
tioned in section 2.6.1, there are a wide variety of scientiﬁc motives for
conducting speciﬁc types of economic experiments, but one large cross-
cutting categorization is whether the primary interest is in treatment eﬀects
or in measuring the characteristics of individual subjects. The latter is the
purpose here, in keeping with the goal mentioned in the preceding para-
graph about targeting the design to the speciﬁc institutional context.
The laboratory and the ﬁeld are both relevant sources of empirical data
to be used in the generation and evaluation of economic theory. But it is of-
ten diﬃcult to translate the import of ﬁndings from studies in the fully con-
trolled, abstract, and simpliﬁed setting of the lab directly to the uncon-
trolled and complex world of real employment relations and production
processes. The approach here is close to what Harrison and List (2004) call
a “framed ﬁeld experiment,” in which the experiments are similar to those
that might be done in a lab with student subjects, but are instead conducted
in the ﬁeld setting of the driver training school, with new driver-trainees as
subjects so that the framing for the (relatively abstract) experimental tasks
is provided by these contextual factors. We anticipate ﬁnding some new
empirical regularities when we examine the ability of our experiments to
predict on-the-job outcomes, and, if so, we will have provided signiﬁcant
evidence for their “external validity,” that is, for the ability of the lab mea-
surements we use to capture individual characteristics that are important
in practice in a speciﬁc real workplace setting.
2.7.3 The Larger Signiﬁcance of Our Subject Pool
The last point we want to make is about the economic and human im-
portance of the subjects of our study, driver-trainees in the truckload seg-
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54. For some promising work along these lines, see the series of papers on fruit pickers in
England by Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005, 2006).ment of the motor freight industry. Much has been made in the last decade
of the growth of the knowledge economy and of the role of workers who
have the speciﬁc education and skills to prosper in it. But what about those
who do not ﬁt this description? In 2005, fully 40 percent of the U.S. work-
force had a high school degree or less, and only 29 percent had a four-year
college degree or more (Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto 2006, 153). As
the United States continues its transition from a manufacturing economy
to one in which service occupations and service industries dominate total
employment, nonknowledge service workers will become an increasingly
important part of the overall picture. The job of TL tractor-trailer driver is
an archetypal example of nonknowledge work that is important in the
knowledge economy.
The United States is a geographically large economy, so transportation
and distribution have always been a key complement to U.S.-based pro-
duction. And as the international trade in goods looms larger and larger in
U.S. production and consumption, the more essential become the tasks as-
sociated with physically transporting traded goods and their ingredients
here in the United States. Unlike some other types of services, the tasks in-
volved in physically moving freight here are not subject to direct compe-
tition from abroad. According to the 2002 quinquennial Economic Cen-
sus, trucking is the largest single industry in transportation services by
employment, and the truckload segment of trucking had a headcount of
approximately 800,000. This means that about 600,000 persons are TL
tractor-trailer drivers at any one time.55 Yet the ATA’s survey results say
that the typical turnover rate at TL ﬁrms is at least 50 percent per year.56 If
these ﬁgures are taken at face value, it means that several hundred thou-
sand people train for and try out this job each year, only to leave it within
a few months, probably having incurred a signiﬁcant debt for training that
most have little hope of repaying. Our pilot ﬁndings on turnover at the co-
operating ﬁrm do not contradict this interpretation of the industry facts.
In this context a primary goal of the Truckers and Turnover Project is to
use the best available means to measure the individual characteristics that
make for success in this job. We will then ask whether the ﬁndings have
actionable implications for business strategy and for public policy with
respect to the labor market and education. Clearly, improving the match
between job and employee by even a small amount would be a real im-
provement in economic circumstances for both ﬁrms and employees. It
may even be that our ﬁndings will help in understanding how and to what
extent the nature of these jobs can be improved, by quantifying more
clearly the costs and beneﬁts of lowering turnover.
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55. This is by the rule of thumb that drivers make up about 75 percent of employment at a
typical TL ﬁrm
56. The rate for large carriers typically averages over 100 percent, but most ﬁrms are small,
and the rates for this group are usually between 50 percent and 100 percent per year.Appendix A
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Summary List and Time Line for Data Items Collected
1. Project Component One: Statistical Case Study 
Data items here come in separate data report ﬁles, each of which has
diﬀerent data deﬁnitions and data errors. These are joined into a master
data ﬁle by the project team, in a labor-intensive data validation, cleaning,
documentation, and merging process. Initial data set covers January 1,
2002, through December 31, 2005, by construction from the individual
years. Updates are planned on semiannual or quarterly basis.
1.1. Payroll-based data. Rolled-up totals of activities for which drivers are
paid, by driver and week. Some pay deductions, but not all that would
be of economic interest, are included. Typical items of interest include
paid miles, the number of units of mileage pay (approximately the
number of dispatches), and the number of times supplementary pay
was received for particular work event (examples: hand unloading,
weighing the rig on a scale). Includes operations-related driver char-
acteristics (e.g., the terminal at which the driver is based). Not in-
cluded in the initial version: the identity of the direct supervisor. Cre-
ated by project team from pay transaction ﬁles.
1.2. Demographic data. Marital status, gender, and (for those drivers
choosing to self-identify to the ﬁrm) racial category. Not included, as
not captured electronically by ﬁrm: educational attainment. Birth-
dates are automatically included only in 2006 updates and later (see
item 3.4).
1.3. Weekly list of drivers employed, with a limited set of driver charac-
teristics. (Used as a check on payroll-based data because payment is
not always made in the week activities took place.)
1.4. Weekly list of drivers hired in that week, with a limited set of driver
characteristics.
1.5. Weekly list of drivers who separated in that week, with a limited set of
driver characteristics.
1.6. Application records. Variables from the application process for those
for whom a hire event is observed; has signiﬁcant number of missing
values. Typical items of interest: did applicant request a smoking ho-
tel room when attending the training school, and how did applicant
learn about the training opportunity?
2. Project Component Two: Panel Study of New Hires
2.1. Initial Intake Data on Driver Trainees. Collected from December 12,
2006, through August 8, 2007, on twenty-three Saturdays. 1,069
100 Stephen V. Burks et al.trainees entered the study, and there is good data on 1,036 of them, ex-
cept that a bug in the initial version of Hit 15 Points (item 2.1.2.5) lim-
its good data that includes this item to a subset of 893 persons.
2.1.1. First Data Collection Block.
2.1.1.1. Sequential strategic form Prisoner’s Dilemma experiment.
Choices as ﬁrst and second mover, plus estimates of others’
choices are collected.
2.1.1.2. Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire. Standard
(short form of) instrument identifying eleven personality fac-
tors.
2.1.1.3. Risk/Loss Aversion experiment. Four panels of seven
choices, each between a small monetary gamble and a small
ﬁxed sum.
2.1.1.4. Demographic proﬁle. List of more than ﬁfty questions com-
piled by project team, including information on educational at-
tainment, labor market history, next best employment opportu-
nity, and so on.
2.1.1.5. Red Button experiment. Subjects oﬀered opportunity to
leave for break early at a payoﬀ cost.
2.1.2. Second Data Collection Block.
2.1.2.1. Time Preferences experiment. Four panels of six choices,
each between a smaller amount at an earlier time and a larger
amount at a later time. Two panels include “today” as the ear-
lier time, and two panels have a front-end delay, with “Monday”
(two days after the Saturday data collection) as the earlier time.
2.1.2.2. Nonverbal IQ: Sections two, three, and four of the original
ﬁve sections of the Raven’s Progressive Matrices. Participants
are asked to rate their relative performance before and after the
instrument, as well as whether they want to know their score
and the group average upon receiving their ﬁnal payout.
2.1.2.3. Quantitative Literacy: Section one of Form A of the Quanti-
tative Literacy portion of the Educational Testing Service’s (ETS)
Tests of Applied Literacy Skills. (ETS provides standardized
scoring only for subjects that do both sections of this test.) Par-
ticipants are asked to rate their relative performance before and
after the instrument, as well as whether they want to know their
score and the group average upon receiving their ﬁnal payout.
2.1.2.4. Ambiguity Aversion experiment. Repetition of Risk/Loss
Aversion, except that we provide less information about the
probability distribution in the gamble choices.
2.1.2.5. Hit 15 Points backward induction experiment.
2.1.2.6. Miscellaneous questions from the psychology and behav-
ioral economics literature about impatience, risk, cooperation,
and so on.
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collection period runs through August of 2008.
2.2.1. Human Resources Data from Firm.
2.2.1.1. Subset of Applicant Flow data, including whether trainee
requested a smoking room at training.
2.2.1.2. Credit score of the trainee (available because trainees sign
a credit contract for training costs).
2.2.1.3. If and when a driver exits, the exit date and a code for up to
three reasons for the separation.
2.2.2. Mail Surveys to New-Hire Panel Drivers.
2.2.2.1. Continuing driver surveys. Forty-ﬁve questions about cur-
rent opinions and recent work events, including some open-
ended ones, sent to currently employed drivers between two and
four weeks after the following tenure milestones: six months,
twelve months, eighteen months, and twenty-four months.
2.2.2.2. Exited driver surveys. Forty-four questions about current
opinions, recent work events, and the driver’s exit event, sent be-
tween two and four weeks after exit.
2.2.3. Mail Surveys to Families of Trainees.
2.2.3.1. Initial survey to families of new-hire panel drivers, to ap-
proximately match in timing the initial intake information from
drivers. Not actually started until the beginning of April of
2006, at which time the families of all panel participants who
had entered since December 2005, were surveyed. Thirty-ﬁve
questions developed by project team, including some open-
ended ones.
2.2.3.2. Surveys to families of continuing drivers. Thirty-ﬁve ques-
tions about current opinions and recent family-work-life events,
including some open-ended ones, sent to families of currently
employed drivers between two and four weeks after the follow-
ing tenure milestones: six months, twelve months, eighteen
months, and twenty-four months.
2.2.3.3. Surveys to families of exited drivers. Twenty-nine questions
about current opinions, recent family-work-life events, and the
driver’s exit event, sent between two and four weeks after exit.
2.2.4. Weekly two-question survey to currently employed drivers, in
their trucks, via satellite link, on Wednesdays. Question 1: How sat-
isﬁed are you with your job right now (1–5 Likert response scale)?
Question 2: How many pay miles do you expect to run next week?
These data will be documented, cleaned, and merged with the main
panel study data set, at some point in the future.
2.2.5. Time-at-home records. The ﬁrm’s recording of when drivers re-
quest to be at home, and how well the ﬁrm does at fulﬁlling those
requests, is accumulating in a data ﬁle that starts in early 2006, and
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documented, cleaned, and merged with the main panel study data
set at some point in the future.
3. Control Groups for New Hire Panel Study
3.1. The initial intake data collected on driver trainees (all the items in 2.1)
was also collected from 100 undergraduate students recruited at the
University of Minnesota, Morris, in a campus computer lab, during
the spring semester of 2007. The same protocol was used throughout,
with the exception that the demographic proﬁle questions were mod-
iﬁed to be appropriate for student subjects.
3.2. The initial intake data collected on driver trainees (all the items in 2.1)
is also planned to be collected from 100 adult subjects who are resi-
dents of Stevens County, MN, the rural county in which the Univer-
sity of Minnesota, Morris, campus is situated. The plan is to recruit
subjects from the county who are not students, nor faculty, nor pro-
fessional staﬀ, during the summer and fall semesters of 2007. The
same protocol will be used throughout, with the exception that the
demographic proﬁle questions will be modiﬁed to be appropriate for
these subjects.
4. Miscellaneous Supplementary Data
4.1. Records of use of the satellite link in each tractor to report trailers
needing maintenance. Available on all drivers by week from mid-
2006; to be updated periodically. May be usable to generate an index
of on-the-job cooperation with other drivers.57
4.2. Records of the use of the satellite link in each tractor to respond to a
particular message from the ﬁrm’s central dispatch oﬃce. Available
on all drivers by week from mid-2006, to be updated periodically. 
May be usable to generate an index of on-the-job cooperation with
the ﬁrm.58
4.3. Identiﬁcation of direct supervisors by driver and work week. This
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57. When a driver is directed to hook onto a trailer spotted at a customer location but the
trailer turns out to be mechanically faulty and can’t be used, it is a negative job event. This
happens when the driver who previously had the trailer did not report it as bad, either because
he did not realize it was or because he refused to take the time to do so. So when a driver does
take the time to report as mechanically faulty a trailer he is dropping and will not immediately
use further, thereby delaying the start of his next assignment, he can be said to incur a per-
sonal cost to provide a public good for drivers. The main issue in constructing an index is lim-
iting confounds with unobservable factors, such as whether the driver is reporting the trailer
as bad because he needs it repaired for his own immediate use.
58. Responding to the macro from the central oﬃce is a formal, but not a substantive, job
requirement. Responding primarily helps anonymous staﬀ members at the ﬁrm’s central
oﬃce, so if a driver delays proceeding with his current assignment to respond, it can be con-data is potentially available in a supplementary ﬁle that may permit
the historical data set used for the statistical case study to be updated.
Updates from 2006 and later will include this information in data ﬁles
already being amalgamated to make the statistical case study data set.
4.4. Birthdates. These are in the standard demographic data ﬁles on all
drivers starting in 2006. Birthdates for drivers observed in earlier years
reside in a supplementary ﬁle that must be documented and cleaned
and merged with the 2002 to 2005 statistical case study data set.
5. Merging New Hire Panel and Statistical Case Study Data. 
Beginning in the second half of 2008, when the statistical case study data
ﬁles have been updated to include all of 2007 and at least some of 2008, it
is intended to merge the two data sets together for those drivers who are in
both data ﬁles. This will permit the regression models developed for the
statistical case study to be run on the panel study drivers, with the ability
to test what additional predictive power is added to those models by the
new data items collected in the new hire panel portion of the study.
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